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Abstract: We study the effects of trans-Atlantic passenger shipping cartels on tourist/business 
and migrant traffic. Collusion had a smaller effect on first and second class service relative to 
third class service. Its effects were proportionately stronger eastbound, but less important in 
absolute numbers given smaller eastbound traffic. Collusion-driven consumer substitution across 
classes was small but non-negligible. Thus, collusion affected migrant traffic far more than 
tourist/business traffic. We also confirm that collusion led to higher fares across all cabin classes, 
especially for steerage. We construct and calibrate an analytical model and show that the pattern 
of observed prices and volumes are consistent with a profit-maximizing cartel, thus buttressing 
the hypothesis that the collusion effects were causal. Finally, we document that collusion led to 







The mass migration of Europeans to North America in the first decade of the 20th century is the 
subject of an enormous scholarship, but relatively little has combined statistical and archival 
evidence to elucidate the effects of transportation costs on travel flows.  Moreover, such 
evidence on non-migratory travel is even sparser.  This is an area that merits careful empirical 
investigation because, as we show, there were considerable fluctuations in both fares and 
passenger flows, which differed greatly in magnitude for migratory and non-migratory travel. 
The dozen or so shipping companies that carried over ninety percent of the travelers organized a 
network of cartels that covered all major transatlantic routes.  When these cartels were 
functioning, fares could rise drastically compared to when firms were competing.  These higher 
cartel rates were effective at restricting migrant, tourist or business travel, and by extension 
affected economies and societies on both sides of the Atlantic.  Furthermore, there is the 
possibility, which we empirically confirm, that cartels affected not only the level, but also the 
composition of travelers and migrants. 
Previous work by Deltas, Sicotte and Tomczak (2008) estimated that when shipping cartels 
operated effectively, they restricted westbound steerage passenger movements by more than 
twenty percent.1  This paper makes a number of additional contributions over that prior work. 
The first contribution is to show that the cartel effects differed by class of service. This is 
important because it provides statistical evidence on the sensitivity of tourism and business travel 
to cartel operation, thus complementing Dupont, Gandhi and Weiss (2012), and Dupont and 
Weiss (2013), who provide a long-term perspective on transatlantic tourism using annual data.2 
Our second contribution is to estimate the effects of collusion on fares, and show that cartels 
increased third class (steerage) fares the most. The third contribution is to provide evidence that 
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the pattern of price increases and flow reductions are consistent (in a quantitative sense) with 
profit maximization, and thus likely causal. To demonstrate this, we develop an analytical model 
of cabin choice and calibrate it to the estimated cartel effects by cabin class and to the 
corresponding fares. The fourth contribution is to provide more systematic evidence of the 
differential effects of collusion on eastbound versus westbound traffic. Because a large fraction 
of migrants returned to Europe either temporarily or permanently, any difference in cartel effects 
eastbound and westbound may have influenced the relative importance of return migration.3 The 
final contribution is to provide direct evidence on the effects of collusion on the “quality” of US 
immigrants. Collusion-induced price increases are expected to displace the most financially 
constrained potential immigrants, who are likely the ones with the lower skills and economic 
potential. We formally test this possibility using auxiliary data on immigrant literacy and 
financial resources by ethnicity (which we map to country of origin).  
Our primary dataset consists of passenger flows by route and class of service from 1899 to 
1911. We collected these data from the exhibits of an American antitrust case brought against the 
shipping cartels at the end of 1911 (U.S. v. Hamburg-American Steamship Line, et al, 200 Fed. 
806 (1911)). We categorize the relative effectiveness of shipping cartels across time and routes 
during our sample period, making this categorization from a careful analysis of primary and 
secondary sources, including copies of all of the cartel agreements, testimony and cables 
between executives in the participating firms. Thus, a subsidiary contribution of our study is to 
explain how these cartels functioned, and complement prior work on passenger shipping cartels 
by Keeling (2012), and Feys (2013), and analysis of freight cartels by Deltas, Sicotte and Serfes 
(1999), and Scott-Morton (1997). Our cartel study is informed by, and extends the work of 
Lamoreaux (1988), Levenstein (1995, 1996), and Clay and Troesken (2002, 2003), each of 
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whom has studied the organization of cartels in different industries during this time period. The 
work by Grossman (2004) on cartel failure and endurance is also of special interest, as it 
describes enforcement mechanisms similar to those employed by the cartels we study, but in 
terrestrial rather than oceanic transportation. The economic analysis of passenger shipping cartels 
provides context for this historically important legal case. Prior to United States v. Hamburg-
American, the presumption in the United States was that the cartels were legal.4 Not only did the 
case provide a key precedent for the extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust law (Molloy 
(1940)), but also influenced Congress’ decision to grant antitrust immunity to shipping cartels in 
1916 (Sicotte (1999)). 
More broadly, this paper informs the literature on cartel operation and dissolution. Although 
this literature is voluminous, the quality and extent of our data is quite rare.  Levenstein and 
Suslow (2014) have noted that both civil and criminal cases involving cartels often end with 
settlements or plea-bargains, resulting in little information revealed.  Price and quantity data are 
quite rare.5 Beyond quantifiable data, we possess the complete library of passenger shipping 
cartel agreements covering all of the different North Atlantic routes over more than a decade. 
While previous studies have relied on the corporate archives of a single cartel member, the 
evidence from the antitrust case contains documents from many cartel members, and from the 
cartel secretaries. Some of the cartel agreements described here are more complicated than those 
typically described in the literature, whereas others are simpler. The evidence reveals the 
dynamic evolution of agreements across routes over time, which reached very sophisticated 
forms toward the end of our period. Importantly, this evolution occurred in the absence of any 
threat of antitrust prosecution. The lesson is that firms are capable of learning to collude more 
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effectively through a process of experimentation, as in the Genesove and Mullin (2001) study of 
sugar industry collusion.  
Our findings indicate that the shipping cartels were more effective in the steerage market 
than for first and second classes. The documentary evidence shows that the firms believed 
collusion was easier in steerage class because the product was more homogeneous, and that the 
firms could construct ingenious and effective pooling mechanisms. In contrast, in the cabin 
classes, there was greater product differentiation. Pooling proved impossible to implement, nor 
were firms able to agree to limit service competition. Thus, we find links between underlying 
product characteristics and the nature of cartelization. Because we possess a detailed history of 
cartel agreements and fare wars, we are also able to provide relevant evidence for the debate on 
the (in)stability of cartels.  A large literature on cartel stability has followed from Stigler’s (1964) 
seminal paper on this matter. Levenstein and Suslow (2006) report that cartels are mostly 
threatened by entrants and by difficulties in adapting their agreement to changes in the economic 
environment. In contrast, the experience of the passenger shipping cartels in our study supports 
the view that internal discord is more important than entry to cartel stability (at least in this 
particular case). 
Finally, our paper is related to the migration cost and migrant selection literature. Recent 
contributions to this literature have highlighted the sensitivity of migration flows to migration 
costs for financially constrained migrants (see Bryan, Chowdhury, and Mobarak 2014, and 
Kleemans 2015). Our historical example provides a well-documented case of large sensitivity of 
migration to the cost of passage, especially for migrants planning to return home. The migrant 
selection literature has focused on how home and host country characteristics affect immigrant 
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selection (e.g., Grogger and Hanson 2011). In our paper, we provide evidence of how the extent 
of migrant selection is impacted by the cost of migration, holding other factors constant.6   
The next section highlights differences in the passenger classes and key features of the 
travelers’ purchase decisions. The following section discusses the organization of the cartels, the 
challenges they faced with regards to price-fixing by service class, and how short-term price-
fixing interacted with longer-term decisions. Subsequent sections present our empirical results 
and our interpretation of them.  We conclude with a discussion of collusion effects on immigrant 
quality.  
 
2. TRANSATLANTIC PASSENGER TRAVEL AND TRAVELERS’ TICKET PURCHASE 
DECISIONS 
 
Our data on passenger movements by route and class are from exhibits in United States v. 
Hamburg-American Steamship Line, et al, an antitrust case brought in federal court in New York 
in December 1911.7  The U.S. attorneys, granted subpoenas, collected vast records from the New 
York offices of the defendant shipping companies, and the offices of shipping conferences’ 
(cartel) secretaries.  These records consist of three main sets of information.  First, there are 
records of the numbers of passengers carried by class on every voyage by cartel and non-cartel 
lines over the period 1899-1911.  In addition to passengers by class, each voyage entry lists the 
ports or port regions of origin and destination. Second, there is a complete set of the cartel 
agreements employed by the lines on the different transatlantic routes during this period.  Finally, 
the records include extensive correspondence between the conference secretaries, New York 
agents of the steamship lines, and lines’ home offices in Europe and North America. This 
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correspondence provides a unique inside look at the functioning of passenger shipping cartels, 
their internal and external conflicts, and their own assessment of the effectiveness of collusion. 
In this section we discuss the nature of product differentiation by class of service and the process 
by which travel was booked and carried out.   
Passengers traveled on one of three classes of service: first, second, or third (steerage).  The 
precise differences between the classes depended upon the exact vessel, and the policies of the 
line that owned it. Generally, first class accommodations were private berths of varying degrees 
of luxury, that carried with them access to specific dining rooms and facilities that were not 
available to other passengers.  Passengers traveling second class often shared berths with a small 
number of passengers that they may not know, and had access to specific facilities reserved for 
that level.  Third class passengers, by the early twentieth century, almost always traveled in 
closed berths, but with a larger number of bunks than in second class, and with access to simpler 
facilities (Keeling, 2012, pp. 236-238).  First and second class fares diverged significantly by 
vessel and line, but it was not uncommon for first class fares to be 50%-100% higher than second 
class fares, which in turn might be 50% greater than third class prices (e.g., see the rates in 
exhibits 10, 11, 752, 762, 763). George Hannah, the Passenger Manager for Allan Line 
Steamship Company, stated in his court testimony that second class service began around 1880, 
and at that time it was only marginally better than steerage, and cost about $10 more.  By 1912, 
however, second class had become more differentiated, and fares reflected this: $31.25 for 
steerage, $50 for second, and $70-$80 for first class (Hannah testimony, pp. 1443-1444).8   
Both westbound and eastbound, first class passengers were overwhelmingly tourists and 
business travelers; Keeling estimates that less than 10% were migrants. Third class passengers 
were nearly all migrants in both directions (some return or temporary).  Second class, however, 
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had a mix of migrants and other travelers. The precise breakdown is not known and differed by 
direction. Keeling estimates that about 80% of westbound and 60% of eastbound second class 
passengers were migrants (Keeling 2012, 229).  The Scientific American Handbook of Travel, 
aimed at American tourists, said that those who could not afford first class would find second 
class an “excellent substitute,” but “that the second cabin is more largely used by persons who 
are emigrating to the United States.” (49). The relative fares across classes and the composition 
of travelers in each class were determined by demand conditions and market structure. 
An important feature of transatlantic travel was the lag from the decision to travel and the 
purchase of passage to the actual travel as reflected in our data. The most striking demonstration 
of this is obtained from the examination of the effects of the 1907 US economic panic. The 
National Bureau of Economic Research dates the business cycle peak in the second quarter of 
1907, yet the strong effect on flows is visible quite a bit later. Hourwich (1911) estimated that 
the full force of the recession was not felt until the fiscal year July 1908-July 1909, because 
people would be “saving the money with which their passage was paid for some months prior to 
their landing,” and that “steamship tickets are quite commonly sold on small weekly payments” 
(Hourwich 1911, 625). The lagged effect of economic factors on travel is explained in part by the 
fact that approximately one-third of all westbound migrants traveled on tickets that were prepaid 
by relatives or friends in North America.9 Feys (2013, 90) notes, “Prepaid tickets sold during the 
winter months served as an indicator of the annual westbound traffic, which peaked between 
April and September.” Prepaid ticket receipts listed the passenger name, steamship line, ports of 
embarkation and destination and the date of issue. The North American agent who sold the ticket 
would forward the monies along with notification to the steamship line, which would then 
communicate with the parties in Europe. The individual for whom the ticket was purchased 
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would receive notice from the steamship line that a ticket had been purchased in their name, and 
then he/she could book a berth. There was considerable flexibility as to the vessel and timing of 
travel, because prepaid tickets were valid for one year from the date of purchase.10 It was not 
only migrants who sometimes booked far before they actually embarked.  Tourists also often 
booked their first class berths six months or more in advance, in order to secure the most sought 
after cabins and be assured of space during what had become an annual mass “excursion season” 
by the early 20th century.11 
The description of passenger flows informs the econometric specifications that follow: we 
include seasonal controls, a trend, and economic variables likely to influence travel and 
migration, and lag those economic variables by two quarters.  In the next section, we describe the 
historical functioning of passenger shipping cartels, which informs the construction of the 
collusion variables. 
 
3. COLLUSION IN PASSENGER SHIPPING AND UNITED STATES V HAMBURG-
AMERICAN, ET AL 
 
Cartels were the rule rather than the exception in ocean shipping from the last quarter of the 
nineteenth century.  Transatlantic passenger shipping firms’ first sustained effort to establish 
cartel agreements dates to the mid 1880s (Mürken, Feys (2008)).  Under British law, shipping 
cartel contracts were not illegal, but were unenforceable (Marx 1953). Nor did shipping cartels 
face prosecution in Continental Europe. Famously, German civil law permitted and enforced 
cartel contracts (Feldenkirchen 1992, 257). In the United States, passenger shipping cartels did 
not attract the attention of antitrust authorities until 1911, when the government brought a case 
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against the colluding firms. The district court ruled the cartels permissible, and by the time the 
case reached the Supreme Court the cartels were no longer active on account of the war.  The 
Supreme Court ruled the case moot in 1916, and the same year Congress passed the Shipping 
Act legalizing shipping cartels by granting them conditional antitrust immunity (United States v. 
Hamburg-American Steamship Line et al, 200 Fed 806 (1911), 216 Fed 971 (1914), 239 U.S. 
466 (1916), Sicotte (1999)). 
Cartel agreements stipulated the member firms, the geographic coverage and the class of 
service. For example, the seven lines that signed the North Atlantic Passenger Conference 
agreement of 1905 fixed rates on third class tickets between the United Kingdom to the United 
States and Canada (Petitioner’s Exhibit 752), whereas “Agreement W” of 1908 specified 
minimum second class fares on each vessel of the thirteen signatory firms operating between 
England, northern continental Europe and North America (Petitioner’s Exhibit 10). 
Some steerage agreements included pooling arrangements.12  The pools were passenger, 
rather than revenue pools.  Agreement AA (Petitioner’s Exhibit 3) article one stated that the 
signatory firms “guarantee to each other the percentage participation… as defined and provided 
for in Article 3 of this contract of the entire steerage traffic forwarded by the parties to this 
contract from all European ports to and via the United States of America and Canada and vice 
versa in vessels owned, leased, chartered or controlled by them…Excepted are Italian and 
Oriental passengers forwarded by direct steamers through the Straits of Gibraltar. (Oriental 
means to or from Greece, Africa and Asia.)”  Article 3 laid out the percentages for the lines both 
westbound and eastbound, ranging from 0.62 percent for the Allan Line’s U.S. westbound 
services (Allan Line’s services to Canada were not covered) to 26.53 percent for North German 
Lloyd’s westbound service. The agreement (Article 6) called for firms “to pay a compensation 
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price of four pounds sterling for each passenger (soul) carried in excess of the established 
proportion,” and that these funds would be paid to the firms that did not meet their quota.  Four 
pounds was less than the collusive ticket price in steerage on any route, which even on the most 
inexpensive routes and vessels was at least 5.5 pounds (Exhibits 752, 1307, testimony of Arthur 
Cauty, passenger manager of White Star Line, 1069-1070). Internal comments to the agreement 
noted that, “The stipulation of a compensation payment…forms one of the main features of the 
entire contract.  The payment of such compensation is certainly not the intent and purpose of the 
contract, but it is the requisite means to deter the Lines from following the tendency to exceed 
their proportion…Compensation can be advanced and lowered by a majority of the Lines 
representing at least 75 per cent of the shares [quotas].” 
The agreement called on an independent cartel Secretary to collect data weekly on 
passengers from the lines, to make accounts and stipulate payments (Article 10).  If firms were 
found to exceed or fall short of their quota, they were “duty-bound to adopt measures calculated 
to bring about a correct adjustment.”  (Article 11)  If these measures, typically rate adjustments, 
fell short, then lines representing 75% or more of the shares could mandate the appropriate rate 
adjustment.  Yet, “no line [would] be compelled to fix its gross rate per adult steerager at less 
than 5 pounds sterling nor more than 8 pounds sterling.” If firms stopped carrying passengers, 
their quota would be redistributed (Article 4).  If they consistently fell short of their quota, they 
would be compelled to lower their rates. There is no evidence or discussion in the record of any 
firms following a strategy of carrying no passengers or carrying below quota to simply collect 
compensation payments. 
Enforcement was a concern for all agreements, whether or not they had a pool.  In 
Agreement AA, failure to comply with terms of the contract would result in fines, at least 250 
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pounds per instance for a “small infraction,” and at least 2500 pounds for a serious one (Article 
20). An Arbitrator, alternately chosen in England or Germany, would fix the precise amounts 
(Article 24).  In Agreement W (Exhibit 10) on second class service from northern Europe, the 
arbitrator was Henry Wilding, a British citizen with a long career in passenger shipping, and all 
arbitration would be in London (Article 16). In the cartels with pooling agreements firms nearly 
always had to post performance bonds, and the amount of the bond depended on a firm’s pooling 
percentage. The documentary evidence confirms that statistics were collected, compensation 
payments were made, firms adjusted rates when carriage deviated from quotas, and disputes 
were sent to arbitration.13  
There were important differences between cabin (first and second class) agreements and 
steerage cartels.  First, none of the cabin agreements included a pool – collusion took the form of 
fixed minimum rates for each signatory’s vessels.  As Hermann Winter, passenger manager for 
North German Lloyd, explained in his testimony, this was not for lack of effort. Firms had 
negotiated “over and over again but did not succeed” in reaching an agreement to establish a 
cabin pool  (Testimony, 1182-1883).  Winter judged it impossible, and Erich Mürken (1922, 
chapters 5-6), who participated in these negotiations alongside Hamburg-American Director 
Albert Ballin, concurred.  The key roadblock was that firms could not decide on quotas and a 
mechanism for adjusting rates across the many different vintages and qualities of ships (Mürken 
1922, 111-114).  Mürken stated that an added complicating factor was that whereas steerage 
fares varied by ship, cabin fares varied by ship and by location on the ship.  This was especially 
the case for first class – first class transatlantic fares on Hamburg-American Line steamers circa 
1910 ranged from 350 marks to 2000 marks, and a high season passage in the imperial suite cost 
20,000 marks (Mürken 1922, 112). This high degree of product differentiation in cabin class 
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meant that passengers on the same voyage paid radically different fares, and a single 
compensation rate for exceeding one’s quota was impossible.  The negotiators deemed a “head-
pool” (fixed quotas of total passengers) like that employed for the steerage traffic impracticable. 
The Agreement AA Conference Secretary advocated pooling revenue for both first and second 
class combined, reasoning that the highest second cabin fares for some vessels were actually 
higher than some of the first class fares on other vessels, and because some of the staterooms on 
some of the steamers were interchangeable, “used as needed for either first or second cabin” 
(Mürken 1922, 113; Keeling 2008, 238-240). Most of the lines disagreed, however, because 
second class demand was growing far more rapidly than first class demand, and therefore fixing 
revenue quotas would give rise to controversy because some lines were much better positioned 
for those demand developments than others.   
In Mürken’s opinion the key roadblock to reaching an agreement on revenue sharing was 
because the firms that had a modern fleet did not want to fix quotas based on total first or second 
class capacity, because that would lead to what they considered too generous a quota for the lines 
with older fleets (Mürken 1922, 115). This was vital because cabin passengers had a higher 
willingness to pay not only for luxury, but also for vessel speed, and this fueled a constant 
competition among the firms to introduce ever more luxurious and faster ships. Joseph Bruce 
Ismay, executive of White Star/International Mercantile Marine and famous through his survival 
of the Titanic disaster, stated in his testimony that firms were under enormous pressure to build 
new ships, and that older vessels were “carrying passengers at a heavy loss because they are out 
of date” (1026). Firms considered, but did not agree to proposals such as that of Hamburg-
American Line’s Director Albert Ballin to create a common fund, which firms would pay into 
based upon existing capacity and which would be used to purchase and destroy older vessels 
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(Mürken 1922, 117-118).  Attempts to collude on quality of service, or to limit capacity, failed, 
and these failures cut into the profits of the shipping firms even during periods when collusion 
was otherwise successful.   
Thus, first and second class cartel agreements were rate agreements in which minimum fares 
were specified for each firm’s individual ships.  Care was made to ensure sufficient difference 
between the lowest second class fares and steerage fares, because firms wished to avoid steerage 
passengers “escaping” from consideration in the pool and traveling on the relatively unregulated 
second class.  In Agreement AA, it was noted that for each steamship the lowest second cabin 
fares must exceed the highest third class fares by at least two pounds sterling, and that any cabin 
passenger having paid a fare below that threshold would be included in the pool (Exhibit 3, 
Articles 2 and 13).  The Mediterranean Steerage Traffic Agreement contained a similar 
stipulation (Exhibit 6, Article 4).  Moreover, the commissions firms were allowed to pay ticket 
sales agents on each class of passenger were strictly regulated.  Despite these safeguards, 
difficulties arose.  Because firms that exceeded their steerage quota increased their steerage rates 
as part of the agreement, these rates quickly approached previously agreed minimum second 
class rates.  For example, in the spring of 1909 Red Star Line cabled the Agreement AA 
conference secretary, “The small difference between 2nd and 3rd class rates becomes more and 
more disagreeably remarkable. Not alone that the adjustment of the Pool by raising the 3rd class 
rates is impossible but also a large number of steeragers are literally forced into the 2nd class and 
thus diverted from the Pool.  On the other hand the 2nd class becomes overburdened, and 
elements are brought into it which according to their social standing do not belong there and they 
cause serious complaints from the real 2nd class passengers.”  Accordingly, Red Star proposed 
that all lines advance their 2nd class rates by 20 shillings (Cable from Conference Secretary to 
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Parties, June 26, 1909, Petitioner’s Exhibit 1376).  When that did not occur, lines that were short 
of the their quota reluctantly reduced their steerage fares (Cable from Conference Secretary to 
Parties, July 6, 1909, Petitioner’s Exhibit 1379). Clearly, the three service classes were inter-
related, and the efforts of firms to collude reflected that fact. 
In many, but not all, cases the cartel agreements were signed by all of the firms active in a 
particular route.14  When they did not, firms coordinated action against outside lines.  These 
outside firms were relatively minor players, such as the short-lived Northwest Transport, and the 
Russian Volunteer Fleet, and they faced a variety of tactics from the cartel members, most 
famously the use of “fighting ships” that would mimic the schedules of the non cartel firms and 
charge ruinously low fares, and the punishment or shutting out of ticket agents who booked 
passengers on outside firms’ vessels (see the discussion in United States v Hamburg-American). 
The threat from non member firms, however, was far less serious than the possibility of 
internal breakdown.  The rupture of an agreement might manifest itself as a full-fledged rate war, 
or simply a lapse in enforcement, characterized by widespread cheating on the agreements.  The 
most significant rate war occurred from late 1903 through 1904, and spread to all routes and 
classes of service.  The warring firms reached a tentative peace in early 1905.  In some cases the 
old agreements were re-invoked, and in others new agreements were established. However, 
collusion did not function smoothly thereafter, with frequent accusations of secret rate-cutting, 
until a second rate war broke out in the second half of 1907.  This war ended when nine 
steamship companies achieved a comprehensive pooling agreement that covered nearly the entire 
passenger traffic between northern Europe and North America (Mürken, chapters 12-13, Hyde, 
chapter 4; testimony of Hermann Winter and Arthur Cauty in United States v Hamburg-
American, and Petitioner’s Exhibit 2). We identify the dates of full effectiveness, rate wars and 
		
17	
lapses by careful examination of the historical record, as detailed in the extensive testimony and 
exhibits of the court case, Stevens (1914), Mürken (1922), Hyde (1975), Keeling (2005), and the 
press (especially the New York Times, the New York Journal of Commerce, the Times of London 
and Fairplay).  Table 1 illustrates the pattern of cartelization, rate war and lapses across the main 
routes during the period of our study.  We use this classification scheme for the cartel variable in 
our econometric analysis.  
In January 1911 the United States brought suit against the firms that were signatories to 
Agreement AA.  The prosecution argued that the combination was an illegal restraint of trade 
under the Sherman Act (Brief for the United States).  The documentary evidence of collusion 
was overwhelming and undeniable.  Beyond the printed agreements, the U.S. attorneys also 
pointed to evidence that the cartel, through subsidiary agreements in conference, had engaged in 
unfair predatory conduct against outside lines. The steamship lines claimed that the antitrust laws 
did not apply because the combination applied to international commerce, and the Sherman Act 
only applied to interstate commerce.  Further, they noted that the combinations were formed 
overseas and were legal in the European countries where they were formed.  They also argued 
that collusion was necessary to provide stability to the trade, and had been beneficial to 
consumers as evidenced by the improved conditions across all classes of service over the 
previous quarter century.  The defendants maintained that their actions against outside lines were 
not unfair, as they “merely protected their own…traffic against the attacks of outside lines.”  
(Brief for North German Lloyd, Brief for the Cunard Line).  Their argument received a boost 
when in spring of 1911 the U.S. Supreme Court decided the Standard Oil and American Tobacco 
cases, establishing a “rule of reason” interpretation of the antitrust statutes.  Price-fixing did not 
appear to be per se illegal any more.   
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As a consequence, when the case was argued in 1912 the prosecutors argued that the rates 
the cartel charged were unreasonable, whereas the defense argued that they were reasonable.  
However, both sides could only attack this question in a manner that bears little resemblance to 
that employed by contemporary antitrust litigators and their economic consultants. The 
prosecution succeeded in getting the witnesses to acknowledge that when competition was open, 
during rate wars, the lower rates attracted an increased volume of passengers, (for example, see 
testimony of Sidney Lister, Cunard Line, 1561).  However, the defense argued that such an 
increase was not a beneficial increase for the United States: “You get during the rate war the 
dirty people…the very people who in times of regular stable business we are keeping out…every 
one whatever who has a few shillings to go to America.  The natural result is that the steamship 
companies might be inclined to accept as many passengers as they can to make both ends meet, 
and the likelihood of the United States being afflicted with a very, very large number, an 
enormous number, of undesirable passengers.”  (Testimony of Sidney Lister, 1515). 
The decision of the district court, not issued until 1914, was that the there was not 
convincing evidence that the rates charged were unreasonable, and that the agreements and 
restrictions upon the agents were not a violation of antitrust law, except that court deemed the 
practice of “fighting ships” an “obnoxious feature” of the cartel and issued an injunction against 
it.  In making its decision, the court noted that the House of Representatives Committee on 
Merchant Marine had recently issued a report on shipping cartels, and found that in the absence 
of these arrangements, “The lines would either engage in rate wars which would mean the 
elimination of the weak and the survival of the strong, or to avoid a costly struggle they would 
consolidate through common ownership.  Either would mean monopoly fully as effective, and it 
is believed more so, than can exist by virtue” of the cartels.  (U.S. House Committee on 
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Merchant Marine and Fisheries 1914, 295-303, cited by the court at 216 Federal Reporter 974, 
October 13, 1914).  The case was appealed to the Supreme Court, which ruled that the Sherman 
Act was indeed applicable to the case, but that it would not rule on the merits because the World 
War I had rendered the agreement void and the case was therefore moot (239 U.S. 466, decided 
January 10, 1916).15 
 
4. PASSENGER VOLUME DATA AND VARIABLES 
In Deltas, Sicotte and Tomczak (2008), we provide econometric estimates that cartels reduced 
westward steerage flows by approximately twenty percent.  In this paper we use many of the 
same primary data sources, with minor changes, to estimate a number of additional econometric 
specifications that extend our knowledge of these cartels. In particular, we investigate whether 
the cartel agreements had a differential impact on the passenger flows of each class of service, 
and the extent to which cartel operation led to substitution between the three service classes. We 
also look at the differential effects between eastbound and westbound directions of travel. The 
substitution pattern is important not only in providing an assessment of the primary incidence of 
cartelization, but also because it helps improve our estimate of cartels’ impact on immigration. 
The distinction between the eastbound and westbound directions is equally important, since they 
jointly give a more precise assessment of the effects on net flows.  
To address these questions, we obtain data series on passenger flows by service class from 
the exhibits in the antitrust case. Although reported by voyage, we aggregate the data by quarter 
and by the routes shown in Table 1.16 The aggregation of the data by route reflects the 
organization of the cartels and the partition of hinterlands to each port.17 There is large seasonal 
variation in the level of flows, which can somewhat obscure main trends. Though in the 
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econometric analysis, we use the quarterly series for reasons detailed in Section 2, and control 
for the seasonal variation by seasonal dummies, we display in Figures 1-3 flows at annual 
frequencies for the three highest volume markets. A general positive trend and the significant 
shock whose timing is apparently associated with the U.S. Panic of 1907 are evident from these 
figures. The effect of the shock tends to be negative for westbound travel, but positive for 
eastbound (reverse migration) travel; it is also more pronounced for steerage than for cabin 
service.  
The most important independent variables are those that reflect the cartelization status of a 
route at each quarter. The construction of these variables is based upon the exhibits in the 
antitrust case and a reading of the contemporary press and literature, and is described in the 
preceding sections. The values of these variables are schematically depicted in Table 1. The 
variable 𝐴𝐺𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇!" takes the value of 1 if there is a cartel operating in route j in period t; 
this variable takes the value of 0 in periods that no cartel agreement was signed that covers route 
j and in periods that a cartel agreement was signed for route j but there was a price war. Values 
of 1 for this variable correspond to dark and light shaded cells in Table 1. The variable 𝑁𝑂𝑅𝑀𝐴𝐿!" takes the value of 1 for route j and period t when there is an agreement that operates 
normally, i.e., when firms co-operate as stipulated by the agreement; it takes the value of 0 in all 
other periods.18  Values of 1 for this variable correspond to dark shaded cells in Table 1. Note 
that in the regression model, the variable 𝑁𝑂𝑅𝑀𝐴𝐿!! captures the incremental effect of a 
normally operating cartel agreement beyond any effects reflected in the coefficient of 𝐴𝐺𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇!". In Figures 1-3, the cartel status in effect for most of the year for each route is 
reflected by the plot symbol. If there was a normally functioning cartel in the particular class of 
service, direction of travel, and route for most of the year, the plot symbol is a large solid circle. 
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Otherwise, the symbol is a small hollow circle. A quick inspection of these figures, and a visual 
“control” of the trend, suggests that collusion lowers flows for the third class, but has very small 
effects for the first and second classes. Summary statistics for quarterly passenger flows per 
route and by cartel status are shown in Table 2, Panel A. As in the figures, collusive regime 
refers to normally operating cartels. Flows are smaller during those periods for steerage. For 
cabin service, the effect appears to be the opposite, but this is because these summary statistics 
do not control for route effects (the low traffic route between Scandinavia and the United States 
was never cartelized for cabin service, but was cartelized for steerage).    
We also utilize a number of economic variables that are expected to affect the demand for 
travel. These variables relate to labor market and macroeconomic conditions in both origin and 
destination countries and are the same as those employed in Deltas, Sicotte and Tomczak 
(2008).19 We provide here a very brief description of them. We use the real wage series from 
Williamson (1995) to construct real wage indexes for the origin and destination regions of our 
routes.  Origin and destination does not refer solely to the countries where the ports in each route 
are located, but to the entire region from where passengers using those ports originate. Because 
most of the European regions consist of multiple countries, we weigh the real wages of those 
countries by the proportion of migrants that they supplied during this period.20 The variable 𝐷𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑊𝐴𝐺𝐸!" is the deviation from trend in the wage in the destination region, while the 
variable 𝑂𝑅𝐼𝐺𝐼𝑁𝑊𝐴𝐺𝐸!" is the deviation from trend in the wage in the origin region. We also 
use an index of U.S. factory employment (NBER) and U.S. unemployment (Lebergott 1964). 
The variable 𝐹𝐴𝐶𝑇𝐸𝑀𝑃𝐿!" takes the value of the first difference of factory employment, while 
the variable 𝑈𝑆𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑀𝑃𝐿!" takes the value of the U.S. unemployment in routes that terminate or 
originate from the United States, and the value of zero for routes that originate or terminate in 
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Canada.21 We also use Maddison’s (1982, 172-173) GDP indexes for the individual countries, 
and constructed GDP series for our regions using the same weighting methodology employed for 
the wage series. The variable 𝐷𝐸𝑆𝑇𝐺𝐷𝑃!" is the deviation of destination GDP from its trend, 
capturing whether the destination economy is on business cycle trough or peak. Similarly, the 
variable 𝑂𝑅𝐼𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐺𝐷𝑃!" is the deviation of origin GDP from its trend. As with the wage variables, 
destination and origin regions correspond to the route destination and origin regions. Summary 
statistics of the economic variables used to generate our controls are reported in Table 2, Panel B. 
One can see that collusive periods correspond to periods where employment was higher (and 
growing faster) but also periods where unemployment was higher as well. Thus, controlling for 
economic conditions can potentially be very important (recall that the controls are appropriately 
defined to be differences of these indexes). Further information on the construction of these 
variables is found in Deltas, Sicotte and Tomczak (2008). As demonstrated in that paper, the use 
of these economic variables is not sufficient to capture the very strong effects of the 1908 
economic crisis in North America. The use of a dummy variable for year 1908 yields more 
appropriate (and more conservative) results on cartel effects. Whereas we expect the economic 
variables to take signs consistent with immigration “push” and “pull,” tourist traffic should be 
increasing in economic activity on both sides of the Atlantic.22  
 
5. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF PASSENGER FLOWS 
THE ECONOMETRIC MODEL 
The empirical strategy follows Deltas, Sicotte and Tomczak (2008), modified to allow us to 
investigate how collusive effects vary across cabin classes and the direction of travel. This 
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strategy is summarized in this sub-section. We take advantage of the panel nature of the data and 
employ a modified difference-in-difference estimation approach, where the effects of interest are 
identified from the over-time variation in cartelization in particular cabin classes and routes, 
controlling for a linear trend in flows, and using a number of additional controls. Our dataset is 
not rich enough to allow us to employ time fixed effects, since many agreements start or end in 
the same period. However, note that seasonal effects are accounted for through the use of 
indicator variables.  
 The general base specification, estimated for every class, c, and direction, d, is 
log 𝑄!"#$ = 𝜅!" + 𝛼!"𝐴𝐺𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇!"#$ + 𝛽!"𝑁𝑂𝑅𝑀𝐴𝐿!"#$ + 𝛾!"𝐹𝐴𝐶𝑇𝐸𝑀𝑃𝐿! +            
                      𝛿!"𝐷𝐸𝑆𝑇𝐺𝐷𝑃!"# + 𝜁!"𝑂𝑅𝐼𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐺𝐷𝑃!"# + 𝜃!"𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅1908! + 𝜆!"𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑁𝐷! +𝜑!"!"𝑆𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑁𝐺! + 𝜑!"!"𝑆𝑈𝑀𝑀𝐸𝑅! + 𝜑!"!"𝐹𝐴𝐿𝐿! + 𝜓!"# + 𝜀!"#$      
where 𝑄!"#$ is the number of passengers in quarter t, on route j, traveling in class c in direction d, 
the cartel and economic regressors are as defined in the preceding section, 𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑁𝐷! is a quarterly 
trend, 𝑆𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑁𝐺!, 𝑆𝑈𝑀𝑀𝐸𝑅! and 𝐹𝐴𝐿𝐿! are seasonal dummies (winter is the omitted season), 𝜓!"# are route effects (the value of which differs by class and direction), and 𝜀!"#$ is a 
disturbance term.23 The distribution of 𝜀!"#$ is characterized by large heteroskedasticity, with 
variance differing systematically both across different routes and different quarters. Therefore, 
all variants of this linear model are estimated via Generalized Least Squares (GLS) which 
improves estimation efficiency by attaching higher weights to observations that are characterized 
by lower variance.24 Passenger flows are assumed to be trend-stationary with deviations from 
trend being driven by a list of stationary variables. Since separate regressions are estimated for 
Westbound and Eastbound travel and for each class of service, we obtain six sets of parameter 
estimates for each specification (as indicated in the parameter subscripts).25 
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 The cartel and economic variables are lagged by two quarters because the passenger data is 
for arrival date at the destination. Although the ocean part of the journey might be as short as one 
week depending upon the route and vessel, the inland journey might have begun much earlier.  
This is especially true for migrants from Eastern Europe, who often had to cross borders, making 
several train connections, and endure squalid conditions at border “control stations” for lengthy 
periods (Szajkowski 1977).  The full journey could take months, and required months of 
planning before that (see Section 2 for a full discussion). First class travel was often purchased as 
a round-trip, and as much as six months in advance. Deltas, Sicotte and Tomczak (2008) describe 
analysis and discussion that supports the choice of a two quarter lag. Related to the issue of lag 
structure is the possibility that collusion largely redistributed flows across time. If that were the 
case, then the various cartel-related coefficients would appear larger in absolute value in our 
regressions. This possibility is investigated (and rejected) below.  
 We estimate a number of econometric specifications that differ from the above regression 
in a several ways. First, the economic activity controls displayed in our base econometric model 
capture the volume of economic activity in North America and Europe. These controls reflect 
both opportunities for migrants for employment and also the income for non-migrant (business 
and leisure) travelers. Some specifications use an alternative set of controls that more closely 
reflect labor market conditions. This alternative set uses the U.S. unemployment rate (rather than 
changes in U.S. factory employment) and deviation from trend of origin and destination wages 
(rather of GDP). Both sets of economic controls also include a dummy variable for the year 1908, 
which coincided with a very deep recession in North America, and which is therefore expected to 
have disproportionately large negative effects on migration to the United States.26 Second, in 
some specifications we drop the dummy for the year 1908 and replace it with quadratic and cubic 
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expansions of the economic variables, to see whether nonlinearities in these variables capture the 
big shock of 1908. Third, we add indicator variables for the first year that a cartel is operating 
and the first year after a cartel has broken down. This is done to capture the possibility that there 
is inter-temporal substitution (after a cartel comes in force, consumers may delay passage to see 
if collusion breaks down; after a cartel dissolves, consumers putting off travel may be enticed by 
the discounts). Finally, we drop the distinction between the presence of collusion and whether 
this collusion was operating normally. For brevity, the results of the last two variations are 
discussed but not reported in tables.  
 
RESULTS 
Table 3 reports our main results, and is followed by three tables that report various extensions 
and robustness checks. The first three specifications of Table 3 report regressions for westbound 
traffic, while the last three report regressions for eastbound traffic. On westbound traffic there is 
a reduction in flows for all classes of service during the period of normal operation, with the 
reduction being largest for third class service (recall that the total effect of normal operation on 
passenger flows is given by the sum of the two cartel coefficients). 27 A likely explanation for the 
differential impact is that the cartels raise steerage fares more than they raise cabin class fares 
(see analysis in next section). The coefficients on the economic and seasonal variables tend to 
support the view that few first class passengers were migrants (Keeling estimates 10%), while 
second class passengers were a mix of tourists and migrants. In particular, the coefficient on 
origin GDP is zero for first class, but negative for second and third class passengers, while the 
coefficient on U.S. factory employment is near zero for first class, positive but small (and not 
significant) for second class, and large (sometimes significant) for steerage. Similarly, the 
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coefficient for destination GDP is positive for all classes, but far bigger for steerage. All of the 
models consistently show an increasing trend to flows, and the seasonal dummies show the 
regular variation, with a strong peak in the summer (first and second) or spring (steerage) of each 
year.  The year 1908 stands out as a major deviation from that trend, with flows off by more than 
fifty percent for steerage, and smaller decreases for the other classes. This is consistent with the 
interpretation that this dummy reflects the large economic dislocation during 1908 and the 
passenger composition of each service class. 
On eastbound traffic the negative effect of cartel operation on traffic is more pronounced for 
all cabin classes, and especially for steerage. Price sensitive round-trip travel (tourist and 
transient migrant) combined with less sensitive permanent immigrant flows is one driver of the 
stronger eastbound effects. If collusion results in a particular number of round-trip travelers 
forgoing the round-trip, this would affect the number of passengers by the same amount in both 
directions. But with eastbound flows being smaller, the corresponding percentage effect would 
be larger.28 As with westbound flows, the parameter estimates for third class are larger than those 
for first and second class. With regards to the other control variables, the eastbound traffic also 
exhibits an increasing trend, but the seasonal variation is somewhat different. The seasonal 
coefficients indicate eastbound peaks for first and second class in the spring, but for the third 
class the peak is in the fall.  This is consistent with the literature, which noted that the excursion 
season for American tourists departing for Europe in late spring and returning in late summer, 
while many eastbound steerage passengers were temporary migrants returning after the North 
American harvest. The Year 1908 indicator is positive (and significant at the 10% level for 
second class and steerage); as expected, the deep financial crisis contributed to a substantial 
reverse migration.  Among the other economic variables the only statistically and economically 
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significant impacts are from North American GDP, which is positive for second and third class. 
This suggests that, after controlling for the dramatic effect of 1908 crisis, eastward travel was 
largely of the business and leisure variety.29  
In Table 4 we re-estimate the models of Table 3 substituting labor market economic controls 
(wages and unemployment) for economic activity controls (GDP and industrial employment). 
The economic controls have the correct signs for westbound flows, and are statistically 
significant for steerage for destination real wages and U.S. unemployment.  The origin 
(European) effects appear to be somewhat muted, particularly in the case of wages. The 
economic effects appear weaker for the two cabin classes, for reasons discussed earlier. The 
coefficients of interest, however, are not materially affected by the use of the labor market 
controls, though they are a bit smaller quantitatively. In the eastbound direction, higher U.S. 
unemployment and higher European wages are strongly associated with reduced eastward 
steerage flows, and to a lesser extent reduced cabin class flows.  These results suggest that, in 
accordance with the historical literature, a significant portion of the eastward flows consisted of 
recent immigrants from Europe who had some success in North America and returned to Europe 
for a visit or permanently. As with Table 3, the 1908 dummy is positively associated with 
eastbound flows.  
In all the regressions reported to this point, the dummy for the year 1908 is used to capture 
the large negative economic shock in the North American economy during that year. We do not 
argue that this dummy reflects only the effects of the crisis, but rather we want to ensure that any 
failure of the other economic controls to capture that extreme event does not contaminate our 
estimates of the cartel agreement variables. As a robustness check, we report in Table 5 
regressions in which the 1908 dummy was replaced by higher order terms of the economic 
		
28	
variables to capture the non-linearity inherent in major economic dislocations. These higher 
order terms are jointly statistically significant in half the cases: the higher order terms capture 
much of the negative shock of 1908, but that the severity was so big that even cubic terms do not 
fit it very well.  Relative to the results using the 1908 dummy, those using the higher order terms 
result in smaller cartel effects. However, the estimates that were significant retain their 
significance in all cases but one.  
A final question is whether the cartel coefficient is affected by inter-temporal substitution 
driven by the price fluctuations. If there were such substitution, the year after collusion 
breakdown passenger flows would be higher as consumers who were priced out of the market 
during the collusion years booked travel at the lower fares. We find that there is no evidence of 
inter-temporal substitution, perhaps because the migration decision is of a “now or never” kind, 
and/or perhaps because consumers had purely adaptive expectations for prices. In fact, in 
regression results that are not reported for brevity, the year after collusion breakdown yields 
lower than expected flows for all three classes for westbound travel, and for the first class 
heading eastbound (one of these statistically significant). Only for eastbound second and third 
classes were these effects positive, neither of them significant. Conversely, one might expect 
passenger flows to be particularly depressed in the first year of collusion, since people may hold 
off travel in the hope that prices may come down. Again, there is no evidence of this. Of the 
corresponding effects, three are positive, three are negative, and the only statistically significant 
one is positive.30  
There are also a number of robustness checks we have done and which we do not report in 
any tables in the interest of saving space. The first robustness check involves possible 
misclassification of collusive status. There are two instances when the record in our disposal is 
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not conclusive with regards to cabin service. The record indicates that there was no formal 
agreement on first and second class service to and from Scandinavia throughout the period we 
study, and we have classified that service as free of collusion. However, the possibility arises that 
the firms coordinated tacitly, given that they did form an agreement on the more important 
steerage service.  We have repeated the analysis in Table 3 coding cabin service involving 
Scandinavia in the same way we coded third class service, and obtained nearly identical results. 
A second instance of ambiguity about the collusive status involves the Mediterranean agreement 
in its early period. This is coded as collusive, but the record makes no explicit mention of a 
distinct agreement covering cabin service. The most reasonable interpretation is that coordination 
covered all classes of service in a similar manner, but we have re-estimated Tables 3 coding this 
service as competitive in the early period. When Mediterranean cabin service is classified as 
such, the estimated effect of collusion appears smaller. This suggests that the Mediterranean 
route is observationally similar to collusive routes for the years in question, as mentioned in the 
record and treated in our standard classification. The second robustness check involved 
estimating Table 3 using a one or two quarter lag. Examining the coefficient of normal cartel 
operation and also the sum of the two cartel parameters (the total effect), which are the most 
important and precisely estimated effects, we note the following. The point estimates are 
generally not very different in value (relative to the standard errors). Moreover, the results are 
not strongest for the two quarter lag: the one quarter lag leads to statistically significant 
parameter estimates slightly more often and parameter values that are often higher. The three 
quarter lag results are comparable in these measures to the two-quarter lag. Thus, even though 
the two-quarter lag is more appropriate based on the documentary evidence, this particular 
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choice is not crucial for the findings we obtain, and it is not the one that makes them 
“strongest.”31 
 
6. PRICE DATA AND ANALYSIS 
 
Collusion affected passenger flows through the prices charged to passengers. In this section we 
assemble from various sources information for fares during our sample period to demonstrate 
and measure the extent through which cartelization impacted fares. The results of this analysis 
will also be used in the next section to evaluate the framework through the use of an analytical 
model.  
Price data for this period are less systematically available than passenger flow data. We 
assembled price data from two distinct types of sources. The first source consists of price series 
put together by economic historians.  Most of these price series are annual averages of 
westbound steerage fares for selected ports and carriers, and miss the first two years of our 
passenger flow sample (some series also contain gaps). The most complete of these series is that 
in Keeling (2008), which also seems to overlap with information reported elsewhere.32 There are 
some more limited data on two ports that covers all three classes of service for westbound 
passage and are reported on a quarterly basis (Keeling 2007). All fares have been converted to 
U.S. dollars, and inflation adjusted to 1902 based on the historical CPI estimates of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. This data is sufficient for formal regression analysis, albeit one 
that we would attach less confidence compared to that of passenger flows. There is insufficient 
information on eastbound fares from these published sources for any meaningful analysis.    
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The second source consists of fare quotes that we have obtained from primary sources at a 
very disaggregated level: they refer to the fares charged on a specific vessel for a particular class 
of service on a given route at a particular time.  For periods of cartel operation, these fares are 
from cartel fare schedules as obtained from the exhibits of the antitrust case (exhibits 10, 11, 33, 
713, 715, 716, 717, 725, 729, 730, 731, 733, 734, 736, 737, 738, 740, 741, 752, 753, 757, 758, 
762, 763, 937, 950, 1026, 1307, and 1869), as well as reporting in the Journal of Commerce 
(New York), the New York Times, and as discussed by Erich Mürken (1922) and Francis Hyde 
(1975).  These price quotes are for the periods of collusion only, but we were able to identify 122 
rate quotes for the same vessel/line/route/class combinations for adjacent time periods during 
which firms were engaged in open competition.  For such periods of price wars, we use data 
from the Journal of Commerce, the New York Times, Hyde, and Mürken. 
Table 6 reports the results of regressions of the log of real fares on the cartel dummy and 
other variables using the data series published by Keeling (2007, 2008). The first two columns 
consist of the analysis of annual steerage fares from a variety of ports (port fixed effects are 
included).  Collusion increased prices from these ports by approximately 14%, and the result is 
robust to whether we include a dummy for the year 1908. The remaining columns consist of the 
analysis of westbound fares from Liverpool and Rotterdam, which are reported on a quarterly 
basis by cabin class. Columns 3 and 4 cover steerage fares; collusion appears to have raised these 
fares by nearly 30% when the year 1908 dummy is included, and by a somewhat smaller amount 
when it is not. The last two columns cover first and second class fares, pooling them together but 
including a dummy for first class service. The effects of collusion for cabin service were 
approximately 20% when a dummy for 1908 is included, and somewhat lower when it is not. It 
is noteworthy that this quarterly series yields more pronounced collusion price effects than the 
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broader based annual series. Part of the difference is due to the time periods covered, as the 
annual data start in 1901, when cartels were probably less stringent in their pricing (annual data 
start in 1903); the rest reflects heterogeneity between ports and lines. In fact, line heterogeneity 
appears to differ by class of service. For example, looking at the quarterly series, we see that 
steerage service from Liverpool on Cunard was substantially cheaper than steerage from 
Rotterdam on Holland America, but the reverse is true when comparing first and cabin class 
service. Incidentally, prices seem to be lowest in the winter with smaller variation among the 
other seasons. These differences are quantitatively more important for cabin class service (and in 
fact not statistically significant for steerage).  
The 122 fare quotes we have obtained ourselves from primary sources, and which compare 
collusive fares with corresponding price war fares for specific ships, do not cover a broad enough 
period to permit regression analysis. We provide some discussion and summary statistics in this 
paragraph. Given that the analysis of flows is at the route level, we have computed the average of 
the cartel induced fare changes by averaging the price quotes at the route and direction of travel 
level. There are only a handful of quotes for most of the routes where quotes are available, and as 
a result the route level changes contain substantial variation. Aggregating fares at the 
direction/cabin class level, we are able to obtain fare changes for five out of six possible 
combinations. The number of quotes for first and second class eastbound is 50 and 38, 
respectively; the corresponding collusion induced fare increases are 40% and 23%. There are 22 
quotes for westbound steerage, with an average collusion fare increase of 68%. There were only 
9 quotes for eastbound steerage service, and 3 for westbound first class service, with associated 
collusion price effects of 58% and 22%. The last two figures are very noisy, and to an extent so 
is the one for westbound steerage. There are no fare comparisons on second class westbound 
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service. These price effects, albeit imprecise in some cases, provide a second measure of how 
collusion affected prices.33 
The collusion induced price increases from the quotes we have obtained are higher than 
those based on the regressions of westbound fares (especially for steerage). Both sets of results, 
however, point to large fare increases that could easily generate the observed reductions in 
passenger flows. We next take up the issue of how consistent are the observed fare and flow data 
with optimal collusive behavior and substitution of passengers across fare classes.  
 
7. EVALUATION OF THE FRAMEWORK AND DISCUSSION OF THE EMPIRICAL 
RESULTS 
 
AN ANALYTICAL MODEL OF DEMAND FOR TRAVEL BY CLASS OF SERVICE 
In this section, we combine the estimated quantity and price effects of collusion with a standard 
vertical differentiation model, which allows us to accomplish two things. First, we calculate how 
many passengers traveling in a particular class of service in the absence of collusion, would 
travel in a different class of service (or not at all) in the presence of collusion. These collusion 
effects differ from those in the volume regressions because they incorporate the displacement of 
travelers from one class to another. The premise in these calculations is that at the collusive 
prices, the marginal first class passengers choose to downgrade to second class, but do not 
choose to forgo travel altogether or to travel in steerage. This presumption is reasonable given 
that the low end of the distribution of first class passengers are not too different in their 
preferences than the high end passengers in second class service. Similarly, the second class 
passengers may choose to upgrade to first class (if the price difference between these classes 
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decreases), or downgrade to steerage; they will not choose to forgo travel altogether. The 
presumption is reasonable given that the low-end of second class passengers are migrants who 
simply have more funds at their disposal. A higher cost should not deter them from traveling 
altogether, since steerage travel would be still be affordable to them. Under this reasoning, the 
only passengers who would forgo travel due to the increase in prices are those traveling in 
steerage.34 Though clearly a simplification, this reasoning is formally obtained from our 
modeling framework, which is a modification of the standard vertical differentiation model (e.g., 
Mussa and Rosen 1978, Tirole 1988).  
The second contribution of the modeling framework is that it permits us to evaluate the 
plausibility that collusive behavior underpins the observed price and quantity effects. The model 
implies a particular pattern of collusive price changes in terms of absolute levels and also in 
terms of relative price increases for each class. We compare these with the observed relative and 
absolute price increases. Moreover, the model yields estimates of consumer willingness to pay 
for different classes of service and the marginal cost of delivering those services. These estimates 
form an additional “reality check” for our interpretation of the results.  
In models of vertical differentiation, consumers are distinguished by their willingness to pay 
for the quality of a service. We adopt the simplest specification and assume that a potential 
traveler’s willingness to pay for passage of quality 𝑥 is 𝑈 = 𝜃𝑥, where 𝜃 is that consumer’s 
marginal willingness to pay for quality. The value of 𝜃 varies across consumers: some travelers 
are willing and able to pay a lot for higher class service, while others cannot or do not want to. 
Since “quality” is just an index, we measure it in units so that 𝜃 is uniformly distributed on the 
[0,1] interval. We denote the quality for the first, second, and third class services by 𝑥!, 𝑥!, 𝑥!, 
respectively, and assume they are the same across firms. This is a simplification, since 
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differences across ships and their departure dates induce some differentiation across firms. But 
this assumption significantly simplifies the analysis, leading to solutions that do not depend on 
the number of firms. It is also necessary for the “calibration” of the model with the price data we 
have. For similar reasons, we assume that the marginal costs for each class of service, denoted by 𝑐!, 𝑐!, 𝑐!, are the same across firms, as are the prices for passage, denoted by 𝑃!, 𝑃!, and 𝑃!. 
Note that this discussion abstracts from the direction of travel. Indeed, we will not consider 
round-trip travel in the quantitative analysis, though we will discuss the implications of not doing 
so at the end of this section.   
A prospective passenger chooses the class of service that yields the biggest surplus for him 
or her, i.e., the class of service for which willingness to pay exceeds the price by the most. If 
willingness to pay is lower than the price for all three classes of service, the prospective 
passenger does not travel. Given that the higher the value of 𝜃, the more a prospective passenger 
values high quality service, passengers with the highest values 𝜃 will travel first class. Let the 
interval of 𝜃 for these passengers be 𝜃!, 1 . Prospective passengers with somewhat lower values 
of 𝜃 will travel second class. Let those values of 𝜃 be in the interval 𝜃!,𝜃! . Prospective 
passengers with even lower values of 𝜃, i.e., those in the interval 𝜃!,𝜃! , will go steerage, and 
the ones will the lowest willingness to pay, i.e., those with values of 𝜃 lower than 𝜃! will not 
travel at all. Denote the number of prospective passengers in the market by 𝑀. Given that quality 
has been scaled so that 𝜃 has a standard uniform distribution, the number of people traveling first 
class is 𝑄! = 𝑀 1− 𝜃! , the number going second class is 𝑄! = 𝑀 𝜃! − 𝜃! , while the number 
in steerage is 𝑄! = 𝑀 𝜃! − 𝜃! . 
To complete the analytical part of the model, we need only pin down 𝜃!, 𝜃!, and 𝜃!. The 
first of these values is the lower bound of the interval of consumers who choose first class 
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service over second class service. A passenger with 𝜃 = 𝜃! is indifferent between these two 
classes of service, i.e., 𝜃!𝑥! − 𝑃! = 𝜃!𝑥! − 𝑃!. Solving for 𝜃! we obtain  
𝜃! = 𝑃! − 𝑃!𝑥! − 𝑥! 
Similarly, a passenger with 𝜃 = 𝜃! is indifferent between traveling second class and 
steerage, i.e., 𝜃!𝑥! − 𝑃! = 𝜃!𝑥! − 𝑃!. Solving for 𝜃! we obtain  
𝜃! = 𝑃! − 𝑃!𝑥! − 𝑥! 
Finally, a prospective passenger with 𝜃 = 𝜃! is indifferent between traveling steerage and 
not traveling at all, which yields zero surplus, i.e., 𝜃!𝑥! − 𝑃! = 0. Solving for 𝜃! yields 
𝜃! = 𝑃!𝑥! 
Therefore, the analytic expressions for passenger volume as a function of prices and quality 
levels are given by 
𝑄! = 𝑀 1− 𝑃! − 𝑃!𝑥! − 𝑥!                                                                                                 (1a)   
𝑄! = 𝑀 𝑃! − 𝑃!𝑥! − 𝑥! − 𝑃! − 𝑃!𝑥! − 𝑥!                                                                                     (1b) 
𝑄! = 𝑀 𝑃! − 𝑃!𝑥! − 𝑥! − 𝑃!𝑥!                                                                                               (1c) 
for first class, second class, and steerage, respectively. We later use these expressions in our 
quantitative exercise where we combine them with our regression estimates and some price data. 




COLLUSION-INDUCED SUBSTITUTION BETWEEN CABIN AND STEERAGE AND 
EFFECTS ON MIGRANTS VERSUS TOURISTS 
The estimates reported in Table 3 can be used, in conjunction with our simple model, to 
construct counterfactual flows in the absence of collusive activity, i.e., to calculate the effects of 
collusion by chosen class of service when the market is competitive.  In our model, consumers 
are put into four bins on the basis of the willingness to pay for quality of cabin service. Changes 
in prices of the three classes will shift the willingness to pay cut-offs separating the bins, but 
consumers switch at most one category up or down the quality ladder (as long as changes in 
relative prices are not too large). This key insight allows us to compute the counterfactual flows 
by class of service.  
In Table 7 we present the substitutions and displacements of passengers between classes that 
the econometric estimates imply, averaged over the period of cartel operation.  This table has 
two panels, each corresponding to groups of three regressions (one for each class) listed in Table 
3. We describe carefully the construction of the top panel; the other is constructed similarly. This 
panel corresponds to westbound flows and computes the effect of collusion over the periods of 
normally operating cartels. We start by inserting the number of observations that correspond to 
this period for each of the classes of service, excluding those that involve Scandinavia (the only 
route for which collusion in steerage was not accompanied by collusion in cabin service). There 
are 139 observations with positive westbound first class flows during normal cartel operation, 
145 observations with positive second class flows, and 151 with positive third class flows. The 
difference in observations across passenger classes is a function of the accommodations available 
in the ships on each route. We compute the total number of passengers that traveled in each class 
during this period, as reported in our data. Then, we insert in Table 7 the flows per quarter per 
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route for each of the classes, right above the corresponding number of observations: 4,763 for 
first class, 8,172 for second class, and 33,297 for third class.35 These are based on actual data. 
We now describe the computation of counterfactual flows, based on these data and on 
parameter estimates. We calculate the counterfactual flows for each class and observation by 
dividing actual flows by 𝑒!! where 𝛼! is the sum of the cartel agreement and normal cartel 
operation coefficients for service c.  The total flows for each class is the sum of these flows over 
all observations of positive flows for service c. We insert on the right-most column of the first 
panel of Table 7, under the heading “Total,” the average per route and per quarter of these 
flows.36 Since the number of actual first class passengers (always per route-quarter) is smaller 
than the counterfactual number, we attribute on the basis of the model that all 4,763 passengers 
that traveled first class under the collusive regime would have traveled first class in the absence 
of collusion. The remaining 4,877-4,763=113 passengers who would have travelled first class in 
the absence of collusion, traveled second class following collusion. The number of passengers 
traveling second class under collusion consists of these 113 passengers plus an additional 8,059 
passengers, yielding the observed number of 8,172. Since in the counterfactual 8,175 passengers 
travel second class, 8,175-8,059=116 passengers who would have traveled second class under 
competition get displaced to steerage by collusion. Finally, moving to steerage, we see that 
without collusion 46,815 passengers would have traveled per route-quarter, while only 33,297 
actually did travel in the presence of collusion. Thus, the number who was displaced and did not 
travel at all is 46,815-33,297+117=13,635. The other three panels were constructed in a similar 
manner. In sum, there is only limited downgrading from first to second or second to third class 
when cartels raise fares, though these shifts are more noticeable for eastbound traffic. 
Nonetheless, positive shifts from cabin to steerage imply that the displacement of steerage 
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passengers is larger than appears from the regression coefficients in the third class specifications. 
This is because the regression coefficients for steerage give the reduction in the number of 
people who travel steerage, not how many of the people who would have traveled in steerage are 
displaced from traveling at all. 
The figures in Table 7 permit us to also ascertain the relative cartel impact on permanent 
immigrants to North America contrasted with the impact on short-term migrants and tourists. 
The difference between westbound and eastbound flows is net migration to North America. The 
eastbound flows are equal to the round-trip tourist flows plus the reverse migrants. Note that the 
total gross westbound migration (the figures recorded in Ellis Island) is the sum of the net 
westbound migration plus the migrants who eventually return. We cannot separate reverse 
migrants from tourists in eastbound flows, unless we make the (somewhat strong but not 
implausible) assumption that tourists were all traveling cabin class and reverse migrants were all 
traveling steerage. We first provide an analysis without this assumption, and then provide an 
analysis with it. The net westbound flows in the absence of collusion are 24,757 people per 
route-quarter; under collusion this number drops to 22,150, a 10.5% decline. The eastbound 
flows under competition are 35,110 people per route-quarter, which drop to 24,083 under 
collusion, a 31.4% decline. Thus, the decline in tourist and short-term (round-trip) migration is 
steeper than the decline in permanent one-way migration. This is expected, since the permanent 
migrants should be less price-sensitive than the tourists and shorter-term migrants (given the 
relatively large present value of lifetime earnings). If in addition we assume that tourists 
consisted of the cabin class eastbound passengers, we can separate the tourists from the short-
term migrants. Under this assumption, collusion reduces tourist traffic from 10,898 to 9,533 per 
route-quarter, or 12.5%, and reduces short-term (round trip) migration from 24,212 to 14,550, or 
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39.9%. Total gross westbound migration is reduced from 48,969 to 36,699 per route-quarter, or 
by 25.1%. This figure is similar to that in Deltas, Sicotte, and Tomczak (2008), and which was 
arrived by the assumption that all westbound steerage passengers were migrants. The 
“refinement” in this analysis suggests that the reduction was disproportionately felt by short-term 
migrants rather than by permanent immigrants, and that the reduction in tourist traffic is 
intermediate of that of the two types of migrants. 
 
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS USING THE ANALYTICAL MODEL AND AVAILABLE 
PASSENGER FARES 
We now proceed to the calibration of the analytical model of demand. Equations (1a), (1b), 
and (1c) yield the passenger volume by class as a function of prices, quality, and market size. We 
fit the model separately to eastbound and westbound flows for normally operating cartels. We 
plug into each of the three equations the flows by class and the average prices, which we 
summarize in Table 8. We replicate the system of equations for the counterfactual non-collusive 
regime, and plug into each of the equations the counterfactual flows under non-collusion along 
with the non-collusive prices (also summarized in Table 8). The quality of steerage is assumed to 
be constant across the collusive and non-collusive regimes, but we allow the quality of cabin 
service to vary because firms may have enhanced quality under collusion given the inability to 
compete on price. Finally, given that the regression results are meant to yield contemporaneous 
counterfactual flows, we assume that the number of potential travelers is the same for the 
collusive and non-collusive states. These choices lead to the following system of equations:  
𝑄!!"#$%& = 𝑀 1− 𝑃!!"#$%& − 𝑃!!"#$%&𝑥!!"#$%& − 𝑥!!"#$%&                                                                       (2a)   
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𝑄!!"#$%& = 𝑀 𝑃!!"#$%& − 𝑃!!"#$%&𝑥!! !"#$ − 𝑥!!"#$%& − 𝑃!!"#$%& − 𝑃!!"#$%&𝑥!!"#$%& − 𝑥!                                          (2b) 
𝑄!!"#$%& = 𝑀 𝑃!!"#$%& − 𝑃!!"#$%&𝑥!!"#$%& − 𝑥! − 𝑃!!"#$%!𝑥!                                                            (2c) 
𝑄!!"#$ = 𝑀 1− 𝑃!!"#$ − 𝑃!!"#$𝑥!!"#$ − 𝑥!!"#$                                                                         (2d)   
𝑄!!"#$ = 𝑀 𝑃!!"#$ − 𝑃!!"#$𝑥!!"#$ − 𝑥!!"#$ − 𝑃!!"#$ − 𝑃!!"#$𝑥!!"#$ − 𝑥!                                               (2e) 
𝑄!!"#$ = 𝑀 𝑃!!"#$ − 𝑃!!"#$𝑥!!"#$ − 𝑥! − 𝑃!!"#$𝑥!                                                                (2f) 
where the first three equations refer to the cartel regime (with the corresponding variables and 
data labeled with the superscript “cartel”), and the second group of three equations refer to the 
competitive counterfactual (with the corresponding variables and data labeled with the 
superscript “comp”). Observe that this is a system of six equations with six unknowns. Solving 
for the quality levels and the size of the market we obtain the estimates of the unknown 
parameters, which are reported in Table 8. Since this is an extremely stylized model, we take 
these estimates as indicative only. However, they do provide a basis for discussion and 
evaluation of our interpretation that the price and quantity changes were indeed consistent with 




THE COLLUSIVE REGIME: MODEL PREDICTION, OBSERVED OUTCOMES AND 
EVALUATION 
How would a perfectly functioning cartel set prices when faced with the consumer demand 
structure developed above? Such a cartel would set prices to maximize profits taking into 
consideration that the number of tickets for each of the three classes is given by equations (1a) to 
(1c). The profit function of the cartel is 
Π = 𝑃! − 𝑐! 𝑄! + 𝑃! − 𝑐! 𝑄! + 𝑃! − 𝑐! 𝑄! 
Substituting from equations (1a) to (1c), we obtain 
Π = 𝑀 𝑃! − 𝑐! 1− 𝑃! − 𝑃!𝑥! − 𝑥! + 𝑃! − 𝑐! 𝑃! − 𝑃!𝑥! − 𝑥! − 𝑃! − 𝑃!𝑥! − 𝑥! + 𝑃! − 𝑐! 𝑃! − 𝑃!𝑥! − 𝑥! − 𝑃!𝑥!  
The first order conditions of profit maximization with respect to the three prices are very messy 
and we omit them. But the expressions for the optimal prices are rather simple: 
𝑃!∗ = 𝑥! + 𝑐!2                     𝑃!∗ = 𝑥! + 𝑐!2                           𝑃!∗ = 𝑥! + 𝑐!2  
Though the expressions for each of the three classes of service are identical, one can see that 
the gap between prices and marginal cost is proportionately greater for the classes where quality 
is high relative to costs. To obtain numerical predictions for prices under collusion, we substitute 
estimates of quality and marginal cost. With regards to costs, we assume that in the competitive 
regime, the firms set prices equal to marginal costs. This may not be fully accurate, but it is not a 
bad approximation except for westbound flows at peak seasons. With regards to quality levels, 
we use our estimates of quality under the competitive regime (using average quality across both 
regimes does not materially affect our conclusions). The profit maximizing prices of the cartel 
predicted by the model, reported in Table 8, are uniformly higher than the observed ones. It is 
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instructive to contrast the figures for cabin versus steerage, given that first and second class 
services have low volumes and are more similar. For cabin service (first and second class), the 
average price increase predicted by the model is 49% eastbound and 32% westbound versus the 
observed figures of 31.5% and 15%, respectively. For steerage the increase predicted by the 
model is 93% eastbound and 60% westbound versus the observed figures of 58% and 31%. 
Notice that even though the model predicts larger price increases, the relative price increases are 
very close: for both cabin and steerage the observed price increase is half to three-fifths of the 
predicted increase for either direction. Thus, the model does a great job in theoretically 
supporting the observation that cabin services prices increased by more than steerage prices, but 
suggests that monopoly prices are higher than those the cartel chose to charge.  
There are, though, some good reasons why this is the case. First, the model omits any 
differentiation between the firms. Such differentiation would reduce the predicted percentage 
increases from collusion. In fact, in the extreme case that the firms are completely differentiated 
(e.g., they operate in distinct markets), collusion would not affect prices at all since the firms are 
monopolists to begin with. Second, the model assumes that collusion results in monopoly pricing, 
i.e., that there are no cartel enforcement problems. In reality, all cartels face enforcement 
problems, and may choose prices lower than the monopoly level to reduce the incentive to cheat. 
Finally, the model does not incorporate the possibility that much of the travel was “round-trip.” 
When some travelers buy return tickets, raising the price of the one-way ticket reduces the 
willingness to pay for the return leg. This does not affect the price under competition, since it is 
set at marginal cost, but reduces the optimal monopoly price. Thus, cartel prices will not be as 
high. It is quite plausible that these factors account for the discrepancy between the predicted and 
		
44	
actual price increases. By contrast, if the predicted prices had been lower than the observed ones, 
then the model would have been harder to reconcile with the data.  
 
8.  THE EFFECT OF COLLUSION ON IMMIGRANT “QUALITY” AND CONCLUDING 
REMARKS 
The analysis in the previous section argues that potential steerage passengers with the lowest 
willingness to pay were those who were deterred from traveling. Westbound, these passengers 
consist mostly of immigrants with low incomes or savings, or who had relatives in the United 
States with relatively low incomes or savings. Given the magnitude of the estimated impact of 
collusion on flows, especially after accounting for substitution across classes of service, it is 
possible that the composition of migrants to the United States was materially affected, and in 
particular, that immigrants with the lowest “quality” represented a smaller fraction of U.S. 
immigration during collusive periods.38 We next present evidence that collusion indeed reduced 
the fraction of immigrants who were illiterate and increased the funds they brought with them, 
thereby materially affecting the composition of U.S. immigrants along important human capital 
and financial characteristics. The latter finding is remarkable given that immigrants traveling on 
collusive routes paid higher fares, but still ended up with larger available funds upon arrival. 
The Annual Reports of the Commissioner-General of Immigration of the United States 
provide the number of passengers by ethnicity and fiscal year (July 1 - June 30) who could not 
read or write, and the total number of immigrants by ethnicity and age category (under 14, 
between 14 and 44, and over 44).39 From these data, we calculate the percentage of immigrants 
14 and older who were illiterate by ethnicity and year. The data distinguishes among 29 
ethnicities from Europe, a number that exceeds the number of independent states at that time 
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period (and greatly exceeds the number of routes). This richness of the data is an important 
advantage for isolating the effects of cartelization in migrant literacy, as it allows us to control 
for ethnic composition effects. With literacy rates differing substantially across ethnic groups, 
changes in the ethnic composition of immigrants for any of a large number of reasons would 
affect immigrant literacy. With our data representing a panel of literacy rates for each of 29 
European ethnicities, we can identify the effect of collusion on the literacy rate of migrants that 
traverse the Atlantic via cartelized routes controlling for each ethnicity’s underlying literacy rate. 
These effects are clearly under-estimates, since some of the cartel effects on literacy rates 
manifest themselves through changes in the ethnic composition of immigrants from poorer and 
less literate ethnicities to richer and more literate ones. We thus also provide estimates that do 
not employ ethnicity fixed effects, which might be considered as upper bounds of the cartels’ 
impact.  
As a starting point, we assign each ethnicity to the shipping route on which they were 
most likely to travel – Italians to the Mediterranean, Irish to the United Kingdom, etc. We then 
regress the percentage illiterate by ethnicity-year on the cartel status in that year for each 
ethnicity’s “assigned” route and on a set of covariates. The results are reported in Table 9, Panel 
A. The first model is the richest, controlling for an annual trend, the dummy for the big recession 
of 1908, and for a set of ethnicity fixed effects. The observations are weighted by the total 
number of immigrants of the corresponding ethnicity over the entire time period, so that small 
ethnic groups do not have a disproportionate impact on the estimates. Cartel operation reduces 
illiteracy rates by 1.3 percentage points. This figure represents a substantial fraction of the 
average illiteracy rate, which for this sample stands at around 25%. The results are stronger if we 
do not use ethnicity weights in the regression (Model 2). Dropping the 1908 dummy has no 
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impact on the ethnicity-weighted estimates (Model 3).  These estimated effects are conservative 
because they represent the shift toward more educated immigrants within each ethnicity. 
However, it stands to reason that the higher collusive prices led to reduction in the immigration 
flows from poorer and less educated ethnicities. If that were true, dropping the ethnicity fixed 
effects would lead to substantially larger collusion effects. This is indeed the case, as can be seen 
from Model 4. The effect of collusion on illiteracy is a whopping 13 percentage points, 
suggesting that most of the impact was coming through reallocation of immigration across 
ethnicities. Dropping all covariates and weights, and estimating the simplest naïve treatment 
model, still yields a huge effect (model 5).  
To complement this analysis, we obtain from the same source information on the average 
funds, in dollars, that immigrants showed upon arrival to the immigration officer. Though many 
immigrants did not reveal the full extent of funds at their disposal, this measure is an important 
proxy of the financial assets of the immigrants.40 We estimate the same set of regressions as 
those reported in Panel A of Table 9, but using instead as the dependent variable the average 
money per person by ethnic group. The regression results are reported in Panel B. Our base 
specification, Model 1, shows that collusion resulted in immigrants with, on average, 2.25 more 
dollars per person. This represents an approximately 10% increase in financial resources. 
Contrary to illiteracy rates, there is a positive trend in these financial resources, and the effect of 
the 1908 dummy is negative. The significance of the cartel effect increases from 10% to 5% with 
the exclusion of the 1908 dummy (model 3), but significance is narrowly lost when the 
observations are not ethnicity weighted (model 2). As with the literacy regressions, dropping the 
ethnicity dummies leads to substantially larger collusion effects: clearly, much of the impact of 
higher fare prices operated through a rebalancing of the immigration flows towards ethnic groups 
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that had greater funds and could afford the higher fares. These findings, taken together, support 
the view that as cartels raised fares, the composition of westbound migrant traffic shifted toward 
those with greater human and financial capital. 
This study showed that periods of collusion result in substantial reductions in passenger 
flows. Even though we control for route unobserved heterogeneity and economic conditions as 
best as possible, one might still be concerned that other factors were at play and that collusion 
was not the driving force. Our price data confirm that collusive periods were indeed associated 
with higher fares. We then verified that these higher fares were at a plausible level for a profit-
maximizing cartel, by using a stylized model of vertical differentiation in a three-tiered product 
which we fit to the flow and price estimates. The model yields estimates with reasonable values 
for willingness to pay for each cabin class level and for market size. Moreover, the model yields 
predictions on the optimal cartel prices for each class of service. These estimates confirm that 
cartel prices would increase more for steerage than for cabin service, as observed in the data. The 
observed price increases are a bit over half of the predicted ones, which is not surprising given 
that the model omits (by necessity) three elements present in the real world, the incorporation of 
each one of which would reduce the optimal cartel price. Consistent with the theoretical analysis, 
we have also presented evidence that the steerage passengers with the least willingness or ability 
to pay were those most displaced by the cartel operations. This is manifested by a reduction in 
the illiteracy rate of immigrants from Europe into the United States and an increase in the funds 
they brought with them. In brief, cartels hurt primarily the economically disadvantaged and kept 
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1 In studies focusing on shipping and migration in the nineteenth century, Cohn (2009) believes 
ocean fares may have influenced passenger flows, and Killick (2014), relying on a series of fare 
data from 1815-1860, argues that a decline in fares stimulated migration during that period (see 
also Feys 2013).  Keeling (2012) has written that he finds it hard to believe that migratory flows 





2 However, many second class passengers were migrants (Keeling 2012; Bandiera, Rasul and 
Viarengo 2013). 
3 Most eastbound travelers were reverse migrants. In what follows, we provide some evidence 
that transient migrants, who constituted this reverse migration, were the most affect by the 
collusion.  
4 This presumption was fortuitous for our study, because the cartel firms were sufficiently 
confident in the legality of their combination, that they kept extensive cartel records in their 
offices in New York – records that later were subpoenaed and preserved in legal archives. 
5  A comprehensive list of estimated cartel price effects of varying fidelity is in Connor and 
Bolotova (2006).   
6 Cohn and Wegge (2015), whose data are for the mid-19th century, discuss the likely impact of 
high ocean fares on the observed positive selection of migrants from Germany. 
7 Until that time, the presumption was that international shipping cartels were legal in the United 
States. Furthermore, British law did not prohibit shipping cartels, although British courts would 
not enforce shipping cartel agreements under contract law, as was done in Germany.  United 
States v. Hamburg-Amerikanische Packet Fahrt Actien Gesellschaft, 200 F. 806 (SDNY, 1911), 
216 F. 971 (SDNY, 1914), 239 U.S. 466 (1916); Mogul Steamship Co. Ltd. v McGregor, Gow 
and Co. LR 21 QBD 544 (1888), 23 QBD 598 (1889), AC 25 House of Lords (1892); 
Feldenkirchen (1992). 
8 Fares were quoted in the currencies of the countries in which they were sold.  Cartel 




this period due to the near universal usage of fixed exchange rate regimes. The Allan Line fares 
refer to the United Kingdom to United States route.  
9 Feys 2013, 89; The Immigration Commission of the State of New York 1909, 38, reports that 
60-80% of all tickets sold by steamship agents in New York State were prepaid tickets; Mears 
1923, 335, opines that 40% “is a conservative guess.” See also Baines, 1994 and Magee and 
Thompson, 2006. 
10 See the discussion in Feys 2008, as well as the testimony of agents in United States v. 
Hamburg-American, the Report of the Commission of Immigration of the State of New York, pp. 
38-40, and extant copies of prepaid ticket receipts (Gjenvick-Gjonvik Archives, 
www.gjenvick.com). 
11 New York Times, March 15, 1907, p. 16; New York Times, April 21, 1908, p. 5; Anchor Line 
brochure: “Special Attractions for Excursion Season 1911,” from www.gjenvick.com; “The 
Scientific American Handbook of Travel” from openlibrary.org; Dupont, Gandhi and Weiss. 
12 These included the North Atlantic Steamship Lines Agreement (Hamburg-American, North 
German Lloyd, Holland-America, and Red Star) of 1892; side agreements of those lines with Cie. 
Generale Transatlantique, British lines for their continental passengers, and Canadian Pacific 
Railway, each reached at different dates; Agreement AA of 1908; the Mediterranean Steerage 
Agreement of 1909, and its side agreements with Greek Lines and for passengers from Fiume 
and Trieste in Austria-Hungary. 
13 For examples, see Petitioner’s Exhibits 953, 957, 1148, 1379, 1567, 1778, and Defendant’s 
Exhibit 134. 952: Cable from cartel Secretary to member firms of Agreement AA, “Statistical 




“Weekly Statistics, Eastbound,” Jena, April 23, 1908. 957: Cable from Secretary to member 
firms, “Monthly Statements,” Jena, April 25, 1908. 1148: Cable from Secretary to member firms 
of Agreement AA, “Communications to Press,” Jena, November 12, 1908.  1379: Cable from 
Secretary to member firms of Agreement AA, untitled, Jena, July 6, 1909.  1567: Cable from 
Secretary to member firms of Agreement AA, “Payments for April,” Jena, May 9, 1910.  1778: 
Cable from Passenger Department, White Star Line, Liverpool, to Passenger Department, White 
Star Line, New York, “Minutes of Meeting held at Paris, 25th March, 09, Hotel Meurice. March 
27, 1909. Defendant’s Exhibit 134: Cable from Secretary to member firms of Atlantic 
Conference, “Monthly Adjustment Payments with the Scandinavian American Line,” Jena, July 
7, 1909. 
14 Our passenger flow data include those carried on both cartel and non-cartel firms. 
15 As an epilogue to the case, we note that passenger shipping on the North Atlantic was 
cartelized until the industry ceased to exist in the early 1970s.  Liner shipping among freight 
carriers also has been frequently cartelized, although in recent years the market structure has 
undergone some changes.  Other industries with high fixed costs, uncertain demand, and frequent 
overcapacity, where marginal cost pricing might lead to losses, have had a higher incidence of 
collusion.  This is consistent with standard models of cartels.  Examples of such industries 
include railroads, steel and cement. See Marx (1953) and Levenstein and Suslow (2006).   
16 A quarterly frequency captures the formation and dissolution dates of the cartel agreements 
and uses the full variation of the economic time series, some of which are at higher than annual 
frequencies. It also permits us to lag key determinants of flows by two quarters to account for 




generated by unusual groupings of sailings just after or before the beginning of a particular 
month. This is particularly problematic for routes with only a few voyages per month. In our 
classification, Britain includes all ports in Britain and Ireland, Scandinavia includes all ports of 
Denmark, Norway and Sweden, North France includes the ports in the French Atlantic, Rhine 
includes all other ports of northern Europe, while Mediterranean includes all ports of Southern 
Europe and Asia Minor. 
17 For example, although there was sporadic service from Libau (in present Latvia), the great 
majority of passengers from the Russian Empire traveled through Germany (Brinkmann, 2008). 
This suggests including Germany and Russia in the same route. Similarly, although there were 
some passengers from Mediterranean countries that traveled from northern Europe and 
Scandinavians that traveled through Britain, there was consistent direct service from these 
regions to the United States, suggesting that they should form separate routes. Also, the 
overwhelming majority of passengers to the United States traveled in and out of New York, 
though Boston, Philadelphia and Baltimore also had direct service. There were virtually no direct 
voyages to New Orleans or other ports. This suggests aggregating all U.S. ports into a single 
origin and destination.   
18  The variable AGREEMENT!" is referred to as “Cartel Agreement” in the Tables; NORMAL!" is 
referred to as “Normal Cartel Operation.” 
19 See chapter 3 of Hatton and Williamson (1998), chapter 7 of O’Rourke and Williamson (1999) 
and references therein for discussion of the link between economic conditions and transatlantic 




20 The wage and GDP data (described later in this paragraph) are proxies because we do not have 
information all countries. For example, we do not have a GDP or wage series for Russia or for 
any Balkan state. 
21 We were unable to identify employment data for Canada. Therefore, for some specifications 
we use the U.S. series as a proxy, while for others we set the employment-related variable to zero 
for the Canadian routes. 
22 There was movement of migrants away from the port of arrival. But from the point of view of 
our analysis, the only relevant movement is between the United States and Canada. Any such 
movement would attenuate our estimates of the importance of destination economic conditions 
for westbound flows. This is a minor issue given that the economic conditions are used as 
auxiliary controls and are not the main parameters of interest.  
23 For the short period that we study, route fixed effects effectively subsume the level of 
population and full-employment GDP on route pairs, i.e., they generalize the “gravity” models 
found in some migration studies.   
24  For brevity, we do not report the variance regressions. The dependent variable is in logs 
because all the explanatory variables are expected to have a proportional impact on flows. This 
includes the cartel effects, which are of primary interest. Clearly their impact on flows is not 
invariant across all routes and times, but proportional to the respective baseline flows. The log 
specification drops all observations with zero flows. However, the amount of censoring is 
limited: approximately 6 percent for steerage and 14 for cabin service.  
25 The evidence on cartel formation and breakdown does not suggest any possible correlation 




of economic controls and the route fixed effects we use. Therefore, there is little (if any) need for 
an IV estimation strategy, which would also be difficult to implement and would carry its own 
pitfalls.   
26 In a robustness check we used year dummy variables, which effectively requires dropping all 
other economic controls since they are obtained at an annual frequency. However, the identifying 
power of this specification is extremely weak, given that most agreements start and terminate in 
the same year, and the second cartelization phase affected all routes. Thus, the estimates, though 
broadly consistent with our reported results, are based on limited information and are sometimes 
very imprecise.  
27 When we do not distinguish the periods of normal cartel operation from those when cartels 
were disrupted, we find no statistically significant effect of cartelization on either first or second 
class, while the predicted effect of collusion on steerage is strongly negative (more than 20%).   
28  In section 7, we show that round trip travel was indeed more sensitive than one-way travel. 
Note that net westbound flows imply that there were many empty seats on the eastbound journey. 
This could be consistent with optimal pricing if the shipping firms could not perfectly price 
discriminate. In that case, filling the empty seats would have led to lower prices on the infra-
marginal seats, lowering total revenue.     
29 Column 2 in Table 3 of Deltas, Sicotte and Tomczak (2008) differs from column 3 in Table 3 
of the current paper only in that the former distinguishes cartel agreements between Tight and 
Loose, while the later distinguishes them between normally operating or not. The two partitions 




30  Another possible margin for substitution is that cartelization of some routes may affect the 
migrants’ choice of route. We investigate this by adding a variable that indicates whether a route 
is not cartelized in the presence of general cartelization in the remaining routes. If there were 
diversion from the cartelized to the non-cartelized routes, it would be picked up by that variable. 
It turns out that this variable is not significant in any of our base specifications, and is more often 
negative than positive. Thus, there is no evidence that there was substitution across routes, 
perhaps because the route structure is substantially aggregated. 
31 We have also performed the analysis at an annual frequency, by averaging the quarterly 
observations and re-estimating the models reported in Tables 3 and 4. The cartel coefficients 
continue to be negative and of similar value and significance, except for the eastbound third class 
estimates that are now implausibly large (while still negative). However, aggregating the data to 
an annual frequency results in loss of information for two reasons. First, the cartel agreements do 
not start and end in January or December. About half of the agreement spells have start/end dates 
in the second or third quarters, resulting in cartel dummies that are not 0 or 1. Second, using a 
quarterly frequency on flows permits us to use a two-quarter lag. Such a lag structure would be 
more difficult to envision in the context of an annual frequency.  
32  We have examined data reported in Cohn and Wegge (2015), Feys (2008), DuPont, Gandhi 
and Weiss (2012), and Killick (2014). These were either overlapped with the data reported in 
Keeling or were not sufficient for regression analysis on their own. 
33 Combined with the parameter estimates of Table 3, these price effects could also yield 
estimates of demand “elasticity” for each of the three classes. However, this “elasticity” is not 




all three classes, because price wars did not affect the price of only one class of service, but the 
prices of all classes. For these reason, these elasticities are not reported here, though their values 
are quite reasonable.  
34 Some evidence on the substitutability of cabin classes for marginal passengers was discussed 
in Section 2. White Star and North German Lloyd brochures also highlighted this substitutability 
(gjenvick.com). There is evidence from the press that such substitutions were in fact occurring. 
For example, the Wall Street Journal, on June 24, 1908 (p. 8), stated that eastward second class 
flows had increased in the first half of 1908 even though first class flows declined.  “Local 
agents attribute the increase in the eastward second class movement to the fact that many whose 
financial resources were impaired by the late panic would not forego the annual trip to Europe 
and accordingly took less attractive accommodations.” 
35 In calculating the average quarterly flows per route, we need a common denominator so that 
we can make appropriate comparisons. For this reason, we divided the total flows for each class 
by the number of observations with positive steerage flows (essentially inserting observations 
with zero flows for the other cabin classes when there were steerage passengers but no cabin 
passengers). 
36 As with the actual flows, the average is obtained by dividing by the number of observations 
with positive steerage flows.  
37 We make three observations based on the parameter estimates. Our first observation is that the 
quality of steerage measured by willingness to pay appears to not be much worse than that of 
second class service.  This is not surprising, though, since each fare is essentially a composite of 




The first good is common to all classes of service, while the difference in the willingness to pay 
for the classes of service is attributed to the difference in the quality of accommodations. Our 
second observation is that the estimated quality of cabin service seems to be largely unaffected 
by collusion: that of first class went up somewhat, but that of second class was reduced a bit.  
The average quality increase under collusion is only about a sixth of the typical gap between any 
two classes of service. Our final observation is that the number of prospective travelers per 
quarter on the typical route is about 54,000 eastbound and 130,000 westbound. This is little over 
twice the number of travelers during the non-collusive periods (around 24,000 eastbound and 
47,000 westbound). Our back-of-the-envelope framework suggests that a total collapse of 
steerage prices to zero would more than double the steady-state level of flows. This is certainly 
plausible.  
38 There is some anecdotal evidence for this. In the United States v. Hamburg-American court 
case, two of steamship company witnesses, Hermann Winter and Sidney Lister, argued that when 
fares were low, as during rate wars, there were large increases of undesirable, lower class 
immigrants. For a long run perspective on immigrant selection see Hatton and Williamson 
(2006).  
39 Data for 1898-1910 are from the Report of Immigration Commission, Statistical Review of 
Immigration, 1820-1910.  Data for 1911 are from the Annual Report of the Commissioner-
General of Immigration for the year 1910/1911. 
40  A large fraction of immigrants declared no funds, which is unlikely to be the true state of their 
financial resources, unless they were being met by relatives or friends upon arrival.	
Table 1. Classification of Cartel Status by Direction of Travel and Cabin Class
GB <-> US GB <-> Can From Medit To Medit Fran <-> US Rhine <-> US Rhine -> Can Rhine <- Can Scand <-> US
I All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes 3rd Class
II All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes 3rd Class
III All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes 3rd Class
IV All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes 3rd Class
I All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes 3rd Class
II All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes 3rd Class
III All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes 3rd Class
IV All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes 3rd Class
I All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes 3rd Class
II All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes 3rd Class
III All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes 3rd Class
IV All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes 3rd Class
I All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes 3rd Class
II All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes 3rd Class
III All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes 3rd Class
IV All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes 3rd Class
I All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes 3rd Class
II All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes 3rd Class





IV All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes 3rd Class
I All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes 3rd Class
II All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes 3rd Class
III All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes 3rd Class
IV All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes 3rd Class
I All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes 3rd Class
II All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes 3rd Class
III All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes 3rd Class
IV All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes 3rd Class
I All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes 3rd Class
II All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes 3rd Class
III
IV
I All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes
II All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes 3rd Class
III All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes 3rd Class
IV All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes 3rd Class
I All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes 3rd Class
II All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes 3rd Class
III All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes 3rd Class
IV All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes 3rd Class
I All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes 3rd Class
II All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes 3rd Class
III All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes 3rd Class
IV All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes 3rd Class
I All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes 3rd Class
II All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes 3rd Class
III All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes All Classes 3rd Class










Notes: In the regression, quarters correspond to indicators as follows: Quarter I is Winter, Quarter II is Spring, Quarter III is Summer, and 
Quarter IV is Fall. Dark (turquoise) shaded areas correspond to the normal operation of a cartel. Light (grey) shaded areas correspond to 
disrupted cartel agreement. Unshaded areas correspond to the absence of a cartel or a price war. Striped cells indicate absence of 






Table 2. Summary Statistics 
Panel A. Passenger Flows All observations Collusive periods Non collusive periods
Direction and class of service Mean Std Dev Obs Mean Obs Mean Obs
Westbound Flows
    First Class 3,817 4,683 298 5,129 135 2,730 163
    Second Class 6,378 6,945 318 8,586 141 4,619 177
    Third Class 31,876 32,688 325 28,258 178 36,256 147
Eastbound Flows
    First Class 4,025 4,267 265 4,728 132 3,327 133
    Second Class 4,004 4,285 258 4,843 124 3,226 134
    Third Class 15,333 18,560 266 12,240 163 20,228 103
Panel B. Economic Variables Collusive periods Non collusive periods
All observations in the sample (3rd class westbound) (3rd class westbound)
Variable Mean Std Dev Obs Mean Obs Mean Obs
US Employment (index) 84.30 9.94 325 85.28 178 83.11 147
US Employment (quarterly growth) 0.72 2.63 325 0.98 178 0.40 147
North American GDP (index) 75.24 10.94 325 75.57 178 74.85 147
European GDP (index) 83.46 7.25 325 83.86 178 82.97 147
US Unemployment Rate 4.70 1.61 325 5.39 178 3.86 147
North American Wage (index) 170.29 12.26 325 170.21 178 170.39 147
European Wage (index) 80.64 17.73 325 83.71 178 76.94 147
Notes: Collusive periods refer to quarters with normally functioning cartels. Passenger flows are number of passengers in 
each quarter per route (mean and standard deviation are taken over route-quarters with positive flows). US employment 
is a factory employment index, with 1914=100. Quarterly employment growth is the change of this index. GDP figures are 
based on country-specific indexes that are equal to 100 in 1913 for all countries. The indexes are averaged based on the 
number of sailings and average immigration flows to yield composite area GDP indexes. Wage figures are based on 
country-specific real wage indexes (UK wages in 1905 = 100). Constituent country indexes are weighted by the number of 
sailings and average immigration flows to yield the composite area wage indexes. See text for sources.
Table 3. Passenger Flows, by Direction of Travel and Class of Service: Economic growth controls
First Class Second Class Third Class First Class Second Class Third Class
3.857 4.718 7.342 3.731 4.069 5.789
0.081 0.056 0.088 0.099 0.083 0.134
0.082 0.194 -0.018 -0.041 0.027 -0.165
0.050 0.067 0.071 0.085 0.068 0.129
-0.106 -0.195 -0.323 -0.084 -0.169 -0.344
0.039 0.047 0.040 0.063 0.056 0.070
0.001 0.003 0.017 0.012 0.006 -0.006
0.006 0.009 0.011 0.011 0.010 0.014
0.013 0.003 0.026 -0.005 -0.016 0.009
0.006 0.006 0.007 0.015 0.013 0.018
-0.004 -0.022 -0.017 0.015 0.016 0.025
0.010 0.011 0.010 0.010 0.008 0.012
-0.002 -0.122 -0.685 0.059 0.167 0.369
0.063 0.090 0.135 0.133 0.099 0.189
0.015 0.035 0.018 0.012 0.026 0.033
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002
0.719 0.579 0.719 1.346 1.394 0.985
0.041 0.048 0.054 0.067 0.068 0.084
1.579 0.665 0.221 0.964 1.101 0.870
0.041 0.044 0.051 0.070 0.066 0.077
0.970 0.487 0.118 0.254 0.613 0.976
0.040 0.049 0.045 0.053 0.070 0.075
3.955 3.229 2.652 4.381 3.281 2.550
0.088 0.087 0.058 0.102 0.072 0.082
2.520 1.537 2.827 3.529 1.828 2.900
0.093 0.102 0.073 0.114 0.083 0.090
1.762 1.304 1.344 0.451 1.347 0.157
0.088 0.071 0.060 0.452 0.118 0.550
3.654 3.202 3.319 4.031 3.139 2.864
0.079 0.068 0.065 0.099 0.074 0.079
2.175 2.548 1.830 2.471 2.131 1.143
0.085 0.080 0.066 0.104 0.074 0.093
-3.050 -2.563 0.135 na na na
1.271 0.116 0.107 na na na
-0.024 0.000 -0.341 -0.125 -0.142 -0.509
0.042 0.065 0.064 0.057 0.062 0.113
R-squared (unweighted) 0.9277 0.9368 0.9173 0.8245 0.8823 0.7437



















Notes: (i) Standard errors are reported in italics, underneath the parameter estimates. (ii) The omitted route dummy variable is USA-
Scandinavia. (iii) The number of observations westbound is 298 for first class,  318 for second class and 325 for third class. The number 
of observations eastbound is 265 for first class,  258 for second class and 266 for third class.  (iv) Factory employment is in first 
differences of the relevant index. (v) Destination and origin GDP are deviations from trend of the relevant indexes. (vi) Weighted R-
squared weighs observations using GLS weights. See text for details on variable construction.
Memo: Total Effect of 
Normally Operating Cartel
Table 4. Passenger Flows, by Direction of Travel and Class of Service: Labor Market Economic controls
First Class Second Class Third Class First Class Second Class Third Class
3.984 4.713 7.571 3.890 4.119 6.125
0.096 0.086 0.109 0.122 0.105 0.184
0.093 0.216 -0.044 -0.006 0.038 -0.242
0.053 0.070 0.072 0.081 0.072 0.122
-0.062 -0.179 -0.243 -0.022 -0.115 -0.221
0.045 0.053 0.042 0.065 0.054 0.089
-0.025 -0.004 -0.034 -0.003 -0.020 -0.044
0.015 0.016 0.017 0.022 0.019 0.031
0.007 0.015 0.026 -0.029 0.005 -0.052
0.007 0.007 0.007 0.014 0.013 0.019
-0.007 -0.021 -0.003 0.019 0.023 0.018
0.010 0.010 0.009 0.008 0.007 0.012
0.005 -0.084 -0.694 0.026 0.122 0.365
0.048 0.058 0.119 0.084 0.068 0.121
0.015 0.036 0.015 0.011 0.026 0.031
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002
0.698 0.604 0.767 1.376 1.418 0.941
0.041 0.052 0.050 0.064 0.060 0.089
1.558 0.659 0.261 0.980 1.164 0.851
0.041 0.043 0.046 0.062 0.061 0.086
0.967 0.465 0.144 0.249 0.673 0.923
0.043 0.050 0.043 0.056 0.066 0.087
3.928 3.205 2.596 4.136 3.256 2.512
0.083 0.085 0.051 0.095 0.076 0.082
2.505 1.511 2.799 3.185 1.794 2.791
0.088 0.105 0.066 0.119 0.100 0.092
1.741 1.328 1.350 0.788 1.452 -0.953
0.085 0.074 0.057 0.302 0.123 0.382
3.602 3.171 3.266 3.817 3.085 2.708
0.077 0.071 0.058 0.094 0.085 0.084
2.062 2.484 1.748 2.312 2.038 0.855
0.121 0.116 0.114 0.149 0.129 0.193
-3.394 -2.658 0.091 na na na
1.268 0.144 0.137 na na na
0.031 0.036 -0.287 -0.028 -0.077 -0.463
0.046 0.066 0.068 0.058 0.065 0.098
R-squared (unweighted) 0.9285 0.9388 0.9163 0.8297 0.8867 0.7514
R-squared (weighted) 0.9598 0.9686 0.9471 0.9468 0.9537 0.8949
Rhine-Canada
Notes:  (i) Standard errors are reported in italics, underneath the parameter estimates. (ii) The omitted route dummy variable is USA-
Scandinavia. (iii) The number of observations for the wesbound regressions is 298 for first class,  318 for second class and 325 for third 
class. The number of observations for eastbound regression is 265 for first class, 258 for second class and 266 for third class. (iv) US 
Unemployment applies to routes to/from the US. (v) Destination and origin wages are deviations from trend for the relevant indexes. (vi) 
Weighted R-squared weighs observations using GLS weights. See text for details on variable construction.



















Table 5. Passenger Flows, by Direction of Travel and Class of Service: High Order Economic controls
First Class Second Class Third Class First Class Second Class Third Class
3.854 4.686 7.246 3.815 3.932 6.029
0.079 0.059 0.097 0.097 0.075 0.141
0.093 0.239 0.107 0.041 0.080 -0.298
0.054 0.070 0.083 0.081 0.064 0.128
-0.118 -0.186 -0.367 -0.064 -0.141 -0.321
0.047 0.051 0.046 0.063 0.052 0.093
-0.013 -0.025 0.000 0.003 -0.028 -0.075
0.017 0.017 0.017 0.019 0.018 0.029
0.021 -0.003 0.044 0.011 0.035 0.038
0.016 0.016 0.016 0.028 0.025 0.038
-0.006 -0.033 -0.056 0.014 0.018 0.068
0.026 0.025 0.022 0.020 0.017 0.029
0.21 1.23 2.58 1.98 4.42 1.31
0.9744 0.2883 0.0189 0.0690 0.0003 0.2527
0.015 0.036 0.016 0.010 0.028 0.030
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002
0.718 0.679 0.822 1.365 1.490 1.086
0.055 0.059 0.061 0.071 0.074 0.106
1.539 0.689 0.314 0.978 1.146 0.959
0.047 0.046 0.055 0.070 0.060 0.088
0.956 0.496 0.162 0.236 0.665 0.923
0.045 0.048 0.049 0.053 0.066 0.083
3.969 3.177 2.645 4.192 3.229 2.565
0.085 0.090 0.056 0.101 0.071 0.081
2.524 1.510 2.806 3.279 1.730 2.812
0.092 0.104 0.078 0.130 0.085 0.099
1.770 1.216 1.279 0.395 1.262 -0.559
0.087 0.076 0.063 0.356 0.094 0.419
3.656 3.137 3.287 3.863 3.075 2.823
0.081 0.076 0.064 0.102 0.076 0.083
2.190 2.479 1.891 2.327 2.090 1.067
0.088 0.084 0.066 0.106 0.072 0.098
-3.370 -2.606 0.213 na na na
1.306 0.112 0.102 na na na
-0.025 0.053 -0.260 -0.023 -0.062 -0.619
0.050 0.071 0.076 0.072 0.065 0.116
R-squared (unweighted) 0.9276 0.9374 0.9130 0.8323 0.8836 0.7608
R-squared (weighted) 0.9587 0.9702 0.9400 0.9486 0.9676 0.9038
Rhine-Canada
Notes: (i) Standard errors are reported in italics, underneath the parameter estimates. (ii) The omitted route dummy variable is USA-
Scandinavia.  (iii) The number of observations for the wesbound regressions is 298 for first class,  318 for second class and 325 for 
third class. The number of observations for eastbound regression is 265 for first class, 258 for second class and 266 for third class.  
(iv) Factory employment is in first differences of the relevant index. (v) Destination and origin gdp are deviations from trend of the 
relevant indexes. (vi) Weighted R-squared weighs observations using GLS weights. See text for details on variable construction.





Quadratic/cubic terms of 














Table 6. Collusion Effects on Westbound Fares by Class of Service
3.329 3.330 3.337 3.336 3.510 3.510
0.043 0.043 0.050 0.047 0.043 0.042
0.132 0.133 0.219 0.272 0.166 0.182
0.037 0.038 0.049 0.047 0.025 0.027
- - - - 0.746 0.746
- - - - 0.026 0.026
- -0.012 -0.250 - -0.076
- 0.038 0.053 - 0.048
- - 0.076 0.076 0.121 0.121
- - 0.058 0.048 0.041 0.041
- - 0.041 0.041 0.204 0.204
- - 0.074 0.069 0.040 0.040
- - 0.077 0.083 0.200 0.202
- - 0.068 0.064 0.039 0.038
-0.327 -0.327 -0.477 -0.477 0.159 0.159
0.073 0.073 0.049 0.046 0.026 0.026
-0.278 -0.277 - - - -
0.060 0.060 - - - -
-0.143 -0.142 - - - -
0.048 0.048 - - - -
0.106 0.107 - - - -
0.041 0.041 - - - -
0.104 0.104 - - - -
0.048 0.048 - - - -
-0.047 -0.047 - - - -
0.067 0.068 - - - -
R-squared 0.6406 0.6409 0.6390 0.6894 0.8737 0.8765
Observations 66 66 72 72 144 144
Oslo (official docs)
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural log of the fare in US dollars, adjusted for inflation. The first two columns 
cover the period of 1901 to 1911, but some routes cover a sub-set of that period. The last two columns cover the period 
1903 to 1911. Robust standard errors are reported in italics below the parameter estimates. The name of the shipping line 
from which the data is based is reported next to the port name in parenthesis. Rotterdam (Holland America) is the 





Italy (official and corporate docs)
Germany (Hamburg American 
and North German Lloyd)
Summer
Third Class Annual Data Third Class Quarterly Data Cabin Class Quarterly Data






Table 7. Collusion-Induced Cabin Class Substitution, Excluding Routes from Scandinavia
Cabin class under 
counterfactual of 
no collusive agreement First Class Second Class Third Class Displaced Total
First Class 4,763 113 4,877
Second Class 8,059 117 8,175
Third Class 33,181 13,635 46,815
Total 4,763 8,172 33,297 13,635
Quarters with passengers 139 145 151 na  
First Class Second Class Third Class Displaced Total
First Class 4,727 629 5,357
Second Class 4,177 1,365 5,541
Third Class 13,185 11,027 24,212
Total 4,727 4,806 14,550 11,027
Quarters with passengers 136 128 136 na  
Passenger flows for typical route-quarter under collusive status
Westbound flows with normally functioning collusion
Eastbound flows with normally functioning collusion
Notes. Numbers may not add up because of independent rounding of counterfactual figures. The averaging of 
total flows is over the number of periods with positive steerage flows. See text for details.
Table 8. Quantitative Analysis: Inputs and Results
Passenger Volume per Quarter-Route Westbound Eastbound
First Class Second Class Third Class First Class Second Class Third Class
Collusive Regime 4,763 8,172 33,297 4,727 4,806 14,550
Competitive Counterfactual 4,877 8,175 46,815 5,357 5,541 24,212
Cartel Effect -2% 0% -29% -12% -13% -40%
Actual Prices Westbound Eastbound
First Class Second Class Third Class First Class Second Class Third Class
Collusive Regime $111.70 $47.81 $32.41 $85.90 $45.32 $33.31
Competitive Regime $86.27 $43.01 $24.70 $61.33 $36.89 $21.05
Cartel Effect 29% 11% 31% 40% 23% 58%
Parameter Estimates First Class Second Class Steerage Market Size
Collusive Competitive Collusive Competitive
Westbound 143.1 124.9 76.2 79.5 58.6 103,500
Eastbound 119.1 107.1 74.7 79.9 60.1 54,050
Prices Predicted by the Model
First Class Second Class Third Class First Class Second Class Third Class
Collusive Regime 111.24 57.74 39.43 90.23 55.78 40.57
Cartel Effect 29% 34% 60% 47% 51% 93%
Notes: See text for details.
Westbound Eastbound
Table 9. Cartelization and Immigrant Selection
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Panel A: Illiteracy Rates
na na na 27.69 26.30
na na na 3.89 1.28
-1.29 -1.64 -1.31 -12.98 -9.32
0.55 0.62 0.52 3.03 2.10
0.05 0.89 0.06 0.30 -
0.08 1.05 0.08 0.46 -
0.15 0.89 - -4.03 -
1.12 1.05 - 6.67 -
Ethnicity Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes No No
Ethnicity Weighted Regression Yes No Yes Yes No
R-squared 0.9740 0.9375 0.9740 0.0755 0.0400
Panel B: Average Money
na na na 19.85 34.38
na na na 2.78 1.34
2.25 1.46 2.78 7.25 4.64
1.32 1.27 1.28 3.30 2.84
1.33 1.27 1.26 1.22 -
0.15 0.15 0.14 0.38 -
-3.58 -4.87 - -1.79 -
0.94 1.40 - 4.86 -
Ethnicity Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes No No
Ethnicity Weighted Regression Yes No Yes Yes No
R-squared 0.9006 0.7863 0.8987 0.0839 0.0079
Annual Trend
Year 1908
Notes. Annual Trend: 1899 = 1. Illiteracy rates are in percentage points (0-100). Average money is in 
current dollars per (reporting) immigrant. Ethnicity weights are proportional to the total number of 
immigrants of that ethnicity over the sample period. Robust standard errors are reported in italics below 
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Panel F: 3rd class Eastbound
Figure 3
